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INSURGENCY AND ITS SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH EASTERN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The North-Eastern part of Nigeria has been engulfed by insurgency over time. This has created fear and untold hardship upon the people in this region. Accordingly, the continuous bombings, kidnapping, killing, maiming and the destruction of properties by the Boko Haram insurgents have become a great concern to the government of Nigeria and the international community. This paper therefore examines the effects of insurgency on the socio-economic lives of the North-Eastern populace. The research area was the North-east with special focus on Adamawa and Borno were the most ravaged states. The paper sourced its data primarily from the administration of questionnaire among the randomly selected people in the affected states. Chi-square (X^2) Statistics was used to determine the estimates. The results show greater X^2 values of 142.86 and 543.54 over X^2 values of 15.51 and 21.03 respectively, an indication that the atrocities of Boko Haram insurgency have severe negative implications for the economy and social lives of the people of the North-east. The paper recommends that the Nigerian government should embark on deliberate strategies to improve our educational system, reduce poverty level, develop a robust counter-terrorism strategy, build a new intelligence gathering infrastructure, develop an economic reconstruction plan for the North-east, consciously involve civilian peace building organisations, and proscribe any emerging insurgency related group with immediate effect.

Keywords: Insurgency, Boko Haram, North-East, Socioeconomic, Implications.

Introduction

The history of Nigeria is rife with different groups with little or full use of militancy approaches to pursue different motives and objectives. Notable amongst these groups are the Yoruba ethnic Odua People's Congress (OPC), the Igbo ethnic Bakassi Boys and Movement for Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Niger-Delta ethnic Militants in the South-South and the northern ethnic Boko Haram in the North-East.

In the North Eastern Nigeria, it is widely known that Boko Haram has been in existence long before it gained media popularity in 2009. According to Alozieuwa, (2012) as cited by

Anyadike, (2013); the challenge posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria is not only about the viciousness of either its terror campaigns or the sect's avowed mission to impose Islamic law on the country, but about the confusion regarding the exact cause(s) of the violence. A lot of factors adduced to have caused Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are socioeconomic, political and religious factors. However, Awojobi, (2014) and Onuoha, (2014) posit that the high rate of poverty in Nigeria has made the youths enlist in the ranks of Boko Haram foot soldiers, which has elongated the conflict since 2009. It is on record that this particular group has been operating under the name Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization with Mallam Lawal as the leader since 1995, but the group leadership shifted to Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, when Mallam Lawal left Nigeria to continue his Islamic/Arabic education in Saudi Arabia. It is the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf that opened the group to political influence and popularity. There is no gain in denying the fact that Mohammed Yusuf is the one that officially founded Boko Haram in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing Shari'a government in Borno and other north eastern states.

The official name of Boko Haram insurgents is 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, which in Arabic language means "People of the way of Prophet Muhammed (peace be unto him) and Community (of Muslims) in line with the earlier generation of Muslims" and not Boko Haram, which simply means "Western secular education is prohibited". Boko Haram has also been defined to mean that Christian evangelism deceptively camouflaged as Western Education is islamically unacceptable.

The violent activities of Boko haram, has mostly been confined to the north-eastern part of Nigeria, made up of six states namely, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. This region mostly accounts for the production of crops and livestock which contribute greatly to the economy of the nation. The region is densely populated as compared to southern Nigeria.

The economy of north-eastern Nigeria is mostly characterised by agriculture and trade. Both of these economic activities require, to a large extent, movement of people from place to place, surviving and remaining in business. Incessant killings by Boko Haram insurgents has crippled the free movement of people in the North-east. Boko Haram activities have not only led to the closure and/or abandonment of people's businesses within the north-eastern region, but also led to migration of people from the affected region. Insurgency has led to the reduction of people's patronage of products from the north-eastern region because of the rumour that members of Boko Haram are planning to send poisonous products from their region to other parts of Nigeria. Also, Boko Haram activities have drastically reduced government revenue derivation, reduced investment and growth of businesses in the affected region due to restiveness in those places. Their activities have also affected the execution of government projects in the area. Despite the state of emergency that was declared by the federal government in the north-eastern regions, Boko Haram's heinous activities continued to increase.

To this end, the disturbing question this paper attempts to answer is: To what extent has insurgency affected the socio-economic lives of the North-Eastern people? The paper therefore examines the implications of the operations of Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria. Specifically, it examines the effects of insurgency on the socio-economic lives of the north-eastern populace. The paper therefore postulates thus: Boko Haram insurgency has negative devastating implications on the socio-economic lives of north-eastern Nigeria.

The paper is divided into five sections. Section two, which is literature review, provides clarification to key concepts and presents the theoretical framework. Section three deals with the methodology of the study, section four analyses the data and discusses the results, while section five concludes and proffers policy recommendations. The paper will be a vital document for the government, security apparatus and the general public. It will also contribute to knowledge of the implications of Boko Haram insurgency. It will further generate theory regarding the implications of Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria.

Literature Review

Conceptual Clarification

Conceptually, insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed struggle. The term insurgency is often linked inextricably to terrorism, as it is a tool that many insurgent groups use to further their agenda. Often, insurgency starts off as a resistant movement, which is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government and to disrupt the civil order and stability. Essentially, it is all about power: one group seeks to wrest power (and the corresponding ability to control economic resources) from the group that has the power using both political resources and violence. Their reasons for doing so are varied, but in its most distilled form, insurgencies are primarily a struggle for power and resources.

Historically, certain conditions can transform a dis-satisfied portion of the population into an insurgency. People resist because of the government's (or occupying power's) inability or unwillingness to meet the legitimate needs of the population, resulting in general frustration and dissatisfaction. Insurgencies emerge when the common man believes he has more to gain by resisting the government rather than supporting it and is willing to risk death in violent confrontation to achieve his goals - which may be to overthrow an existing government, expel an occupying power or change the existing system (Ogochukwu, 2013).

The most important prerequisite for an insurgency is a vulnerable population, as it is usually when the majority of the population is generally open to change - for economic, social, or political reasons - that an insurgent leadership is able to mobilize the populace and take advantage of the lack of government control. Insurgencies are normally won or lost through the will of the population and most successful counterinsurgencies have focused on meeting the economic and political needs of the populace in order to win back support for the government and coax the people into betraying the insurgents. Insurgent groups attempt to win the support of the population by promising a better life through a better distribution of state resources or coercing them through terror (Ogochukwu, 2013).

The activities of the sect have been of concern to scholars who have written various academic papers on the modus operandi of Boko Haram. Eme and Ibieta, (2012) analyze the origin and ideology of the sect. From their analysis they posit that Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad better known as Boko Haram is an Islamic terrorist group that has a strong operational base in the northeast of Nigeria. The ideology of the sect according to them is to bring to an end the secular system of government and introduce sharia law in Nigeria. However, according to Lister, (2012) the foot soldiers of the sect are disgruntled youths who have been paid by unscrupulous Northern politicians to cause mayhem in the country because of their selfish ambitions. Cook (2013); Awojobi (2014); Onuoha (2014) all

assert that the youths enlisted into Boko Haram because of the prevalence of poverty in the North.

Eme and Ibietan (2012); Ogochukwu (2013); Odita and Akan (2014) agree in their studies on the Boko Haram insurgency, that the sect's heinous crimes hinder socioeconomic development in Nigeria. Other studies which have adopted a notion of political instability similar to ours have found effects of instability on socio-economic lives of the north-eastern populace (Crenshaw, 2009). Ford (2007) indicated that poverty was the major cause of conflict in Africa. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) examine conflicts in Africa, and from their findings, notice the interface between income and conflict.

Theoretical Framework

The paper uses the 'poverty breeds conflict' hypothesis for its theoretical framework. Academic debates continue on the correlation between poverty and insecurity. Some scholars have argued that most of the conflicts in developing countries are caused by the prevalence of poverty. There is causality from high poverty rate to conflict (Kanbur, 2007). Ted Gurr's deprivation theory subscribes to this assumption. The theory explains why the youths are always taking to violence. According to the deprivation theory, "aggression is always a consequence of frustration" and "frustration always leads to aggression" (Leeds, 1978). "The poor are led to violence owing to their relative deprivation and needs," (Odumosu, 1999 cited in Awojobi, 2014). Frustrations, lack of income, unemployment, have prompted the youths in northern Nigeria to become more violent in their quest for survival.

Methodology

This paper employs the survey approach, which involves field data gathering that describes events and then organizes, tabulates, depicts, describes and analyzes data for policy decision. It discovers the inherent implications that exist, opinions that are held, processes that are going on, impacts that are evident and trends that are developing. It seeks to establish the socio-economic implications of Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria.

To this end, the study area is North-eastern Nigeria, which comprises six states. Based on the preliminary 2006 Census figures retrieved from population.gov.ng, as edited on November 3, 2018, these states with their respective populations are Adamawa - 3,178,950; Bauchi - 4,653,066; Borno - 4,171,104; Gombe- 2,365,040; Taraba - 2,294,800 and Yobe - 2,321,339. The region is mostly known for the production of crops and livestock, which contribute greatly to the growth of the Nigerian economy. As stated above, the region has a total population of 18,984,299. For the purpose of this study, Adamawa and Borno, which are the most affected states with the total population of 7,350,054, are used as our sample space, which is 38.7% of the entire population.

The paper adopts the use of both primary and secondary data. However, primary data source, which comprises first-hand information collected by the researcher through interview, questionnaire, observation, etc. was mostly used here with questionnaire as the main instrument. Secondary data were in addition sourced from NBS as well as relevant journal articles and recognised websites. The choice of primary data and instrumentation was attributed to the nature of our research topic.

Questionnaires were divided into two sections (A and B). Section A. dealt with the demographic distribution of the respondents while section B. dealt with respondents'

response measurement, using the Likert Rating Scale (LRS) method with options such as "Strongly Agreed", "Agreed", "Indifferent", "Disagreed", and "Strongly Disagreed" for respondents to tick. The data obtained from this group were used to analyse the socio-economic implications of the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria.

Degrees of frequency distribution with percentages and Chi-square were employed in data analysis to test the postulated propositions. The Chi-square method is used to compare the observed variations in frequency distribution with the expected values. The model classifies the data into two - observed and expected frequencies. The observed frequencies represent the actual values obtained when there is independence. The expected frequencies represent the values that should exist where two variables are dependent. It is represented by the formula:

$$X^2 = \sum \frac{(Fo - Fe)^2}{Fe}$$

where X^2 =Chi-Square Fo = Observed Frequency, Fe = Expected Frequency, and \sum = Summation. If the compared value of calculated chi-square (X^2_c) is greater than the critical value (X^2) at 5% level of significance and degree of freedom ($k-1$), we accept the postulated proposition, i.e., Boko Haram insurgency has negative devastating implications on the socio-economic lives of the people north-eastern Nigeria.

Results and Discussion

A total of six hundred (600) questionnaires were distributed, out of which five hundred and sixty seven (567) were returned. Below is the presentation of responses from the duly completed and retrieved questionnaires.

Table 4.1 Demographic Distributions of Respondents

Distributions	Frequency	Percentage
Age Group in years		
Below 18 years	87	15
18 - 40	252	44
41 - 60	213	38
Above 60 years	15	3
Total	567	100
Gender		
Male	421	74
Female	146	26
Total	567	100

Literacy Level of Respondents

None	1	0.17
Primary School Leaving Certificate	2	0.35
SSCE/WAEC/GCE	147	25.90
OND/NCE	45	7.90
HND	53	9.30
B.Sc./B.A.B.Tech	286	50.44
MBA./M.A./M.Sc.	13	2.29
Total	567	100

Marital Status of Respondents

Single	210	37.03
Married	193	34.03
Divorced	0	0.00
Widow	100	17.63
Widower	64	11.3
Total	567	100

Religious Status of the Respondents

Christianity	214	37.74
Islam	353	62.26
Others	0	0.00
Total	567	100

Employment Status of Respondents

Employed	226	40
Self-Employed	150	27
Unemployed	115	20
Others	76	13
Total	567	100

Source: Field Data Survey, 2018

Table 1 above shows that 44% and 38% of the respondents are within the age limits: 18-40 years and 41-60 years, respectively and the minimal number of respondents fell within those above 60 years and below 18 years with 3% and 15%, respectively. The male respondents represented seventy-four per cent (74%) while female respondents stood at twenty-six (26%).

It noticed that 52.73% of the respondents have degrees and post graduate degrees, 9.30% with HND, 7.90% are NCE/Diploma holders, while 25.90% are SSCE holders. Primary and non-formal education stood at 0.35%, and 0.17% respectively. It is observed that majority of the respondents are singles with 37.03% and the married with 34.03%. There were no divorced respondents.

It can also be seen from the table that Muslims are the majority with 62.26% and Christian respondents comprising 37.74%). Finally, the table shows that 40% of the respondents are employed, 27% are self-employed, 20% are unemployed with others standing at 13%.

Table 2: Summary of Responses based on LRS

S/N		SA	A	I	D	SD	TOTAL
1.	You do not support the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents.	354	175	31	7	0	567
2.	Amnesty should be granted to the insurgents.	97	124	92	131	123	567
3.	Government negligence was the cause of the insurgency.	152	221	104	62	28	567
4.	Poverty and Illiteracy contribute to insurgency.	152	126	99	173	17	567
5.	Improving the educational system is a solution to the insurgency.	187	234	24	48	74	567
6.	Reducing the poverty level is a solution to the insurgency.	272	148	96	44	7	567
7.	You have been a victim of Boko Haram insurgency.	203	285	32	47	0	567
8.	Business activities have reduced due to the insurgency.	217	187	83	46	34	567
9.	Farming activities have reduced due to the insurgency.	301	124	35	89	18	567
10.	Tourism has reduced due to the insurgency.	158	196	102	48	63	567
11.	Religious tolerance has reduced due to the insurgency.	121	134	115	126	71	567
12.	Schools have been affected by the insurgency.	316	103	88	57	3	567
13.	There has been rampant case of migration due to the insurgency.	275	164	106	18	4	567
14.	The civilian JTF has been helpful in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency.	309	112	79	44	23	567

Source: Field Data Collected (Observed Frequency), 2018

It is revealed from Table 2 that a majority of the respondents agreed to government negligence, poverty and illiteracy as contributory factors to insurgency. Also, it is shown that a majority of the respondents were victims of Boko Haram insurgency. It is further observed from the agreement of a majority of the respondents that religious tolerance, tourism, farming and business activities have all reduced (or collapsed in some cases), due to insurgency. Also, schools have been negatively affected, with rampant cases of migration of people to other parts of Nigeria.

To measure the research objectives and answer the research question, the researcher subjected the earlier stated proposition to test using Chi-square statistical tool for analysis. The paper postulated earlier that Boko Haram Insurgency has negative devastating implications on the socio-economic life of north-eastern Nigeria. Responses 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 were used to conduct the test, which are broken into two tables (3a and 3b).

Table 3a: Chi Square Contingency Table and Computation

Responses	8	9	10	Total
SA(o)	217	301	158	676
(e)	225.33	225.33	225.33	
(o-e)	-8.33	75.67	67.33	
(o-e) ²	69.39	5725.95	4533.33	
(o-e) ² /e	0.31	25.41	20.12	
A(o)	187	124	196	507
(e)	169	169	169	
(o-e)	18	-45	27	
(o-e) ²	324	2025	729	
(o-e) ² /e	1.92	11.98	4.31	
I(o)	83	35	102	220
(e)	73.33	73.33	73.33	
(o-e)	9.67	-38.33	28.67	
(o-e) ²	93.51	1469.19	821.97	
(o-e) ² /e	1.28	20.04	11.21	
D(o)	46	89	48	183
(e)	61	61	61	
(o-e)	-15	28	-13	
(o-e) ²	225	784	169	
(o-e) ² /e	3.69	12.85	2.77	
SD(o)	34	18	63	115
(e)	38.33	38.33	38.33	
(o-e)	-4.33	-20.33	24.67	
(o-e) ²	18.75	413.31	608.61	
(o-e) ² /e	0.49	10.78	15.88	
Total	567	567	567	1701
				X ² =142.86

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2018

Table 3b: Chi Square Contingency Table and Computation

Responses	7	11	12	13	Total
SA(o)	203	121	316	275	915
(e)	228.75	228.75	228.75	228.75	
(o-e)	-25.75	-107.75	87.25	46.25	
(o-e) ²	663.06	11610.06	7612.56	2139.06	
(o-e) ² /e	3	50.75	33.28	9.35	
A(o)	285	134	103	164	686
(e)	171.5	171.5	171.5	171.5	
(o-e)	113.5	-37.5	-68.5	-7.5	
(o-e) ²	12882.25	1406.25	4692.25	56.25	
(o-e) ² /e	75.12	8.2	27.36	0.33	
I(o)	32	113	88	106	339
(e)	84.75	84.75	84.75	84.75	
(o-e)	-52.75	28.25	3.25	21.25	
(o-e) ²	2782.56	798.06	10.56	451.56	
(o-e) ² /e	32.83	9.42	0.12	5.33	
D(o)	47	126	57	18	248
(e)	62	62	62	62	
(o-e)	-15	64	-5	-44	
(o-e) ²	225	4096	25	1936	
(o-e) ² /e	3.63	66.06	0.4	31.23	
SD(o)	0	72	3	4	78
(e)	19.5	19.5	19.5	19.5	
(o-e)	-19.5	52.5	-16.5	15.5	
(o-e) ²	380.25	2756.25	272.25	240.25	
(o-e) ² /e	19.5	141.35	13.96	12.32	
Total	567	567	567	567	2268
					X ² =543.54

Source: Researcher's Computation, 2018

Tables 3a and 3b were computed using chi-square test statistic, given as:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{\sum(o-e)^2}{e}$$

Expected Frequency = $\frac{(\text{Row Total})(\text{Column Total})}{\text{Grand Total}}$

Grand Total

Degree of freedom (df) = (r - 1) * (c - 1), where c represents the number of columns and r the number of rows.

Table 3a shows the degree of freedom (df) = (5 - 1) * (3 - 1) = 8. Calculated value of $\chi^2 = 142.86$. At $\alpha = 0.05$ level of significance, we obtain a tabulated value of 15.51. Therefore, since the calculated value (142.86) is greater than the tabulated value of 15.51, we have no enough evidence to reject the stated proposition.

Also, Table 3b shows the degree of freedom (df) = (5 - 1) * (4 - 1) = 12. Calculated value of $\chi^2 = 543.54$. At $\alpha = 0.05$ level of significance, we obtain a tabulated value of 21.03. Therefore, since $X^2 > X^2_t$, we lack sufficient evidence to reject our earlier stated proposition. This is an indication that Boko Haram insurgency has negative and devastating implications on the socio-economic life of north-eastern Nigeria.

Discussion of Major Findings

The activities of Boko Haram insurgency have left a lot of people maimed and many women kidnapped and raped. These have left the families of the dead, the injured, the raped and the kidnapped in agony. In a nutshell, most of the family members of Boko Haram victims are going through trauma.

Furthermore, the atrocities of the sect have socioeconomic implications, especially in the northeast where Boko Haram has control. The economic, social and psychological costs of the insurgency cannot be quantified. Commercial activities in the northeast have been reduced because of the unprecedented attacks by the sect. Banks, markets and shops do not open regularly due to the fear of coordinated attacks from Boko Haram. According to Okereocha (2012), human capital and investor drain is hampering economic development in the northeast due to the attacks on banks, markets, parks and government departments. The attacks on these commercial areas have led to the migration of people to other parts of the country.

Apart from the migration of people who have businesses in the northeast to other parts of Nigeria, foreign nationals of Chad, Cameroun and Niger are being repatriated to their home countries because the Nigerian government said they constitute members of Boko Haram. Evidence has shown that not all the repatriated nationals of the above countries are members of Boko Haram. Definitely, those who have businesses in cities like Maiduguri and Yola will form part of those that are sent homes which has affected economic activities in these cities. The never-ending attacks by Boko Haram in the north-east have a severe impact on the economic lives of people living in these areas. A case in point is the work duration of most commercial banks in the affected areas which has been reduced from eight hours to three (Mohammed, 2012). "In Maiduguri, Borno state, where the sect originated, the frequent bombings and clashes between Boko Haram and the security agents have weighed down seriously on the commercial and business activities in the city as many businesses have reportedly crumbled while many people have fled the state" (Shiklam, 2012).

There is already a dichotomy in the development of northern and southeast Nigeria. The poverty profile of Nigeria that was released in 2018 by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicated that the northern region has more poor people than the southern region, with some states like Adamawa and Bauchi in the north-east having over 70% poverty rates.

Just as the economic implications of Boko Haram atrocities cannot be quantified, the social costs are enormous. The church, school, market, clinic and mosque are potential targets of Boko Haram. For example, in April 2014, shortly after the bombing of Nyanya market in FCT, Federal Government Girls' College, Chibok, was attacked, which subsequently led to the abduction of over 250 female students. Up till now, many of these girls are still in captivity. Also, Dapchi girls were kidnapped and later released through federal government negotiation, yet, one Leah Saribu, who refused to deny her Christian faith, is still in Boko Haram captivity. Attacks on these social places have prevented people from going to them. Some students have stopped going to school, others have been transferred to the southern part of the country to continue their education. Christians are afraid to go to church on Sundays for worship due to the fear of being attacked by the sect. The same thing goes for the Muslims who abandon their worship centres because of Boko Haram attacks. The markets have become deserted. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) that was created by the government after the end of Nigerian Civil War to foster unity among Nigerians is

under threat due to Boko Haram attacks. Some parents from the south have protested vehemently against the posting of their children to the northeast.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Although our nation stands on the cusp of greatness, a stupendous national disaster threatens. The well-being of the nation hangs in the balance. We as Nigerian citizens need to act decisively, or else the demands of the moment will find us wanting and history will issue a terrible verdict against us. We need to protect this nation and her children. It is therefore recommended that the Nigerian government embarks on deliberate strategies to improve our educational system and reduce the poverty level. Also, the government should develop a robust counter-terrorism strategy, build a new intelligence gathering infrastructure, build effective information management and strategic communication, develop an economic reconstruction plan for the north-east, as well as consciously involve civilian peace building organisations. Finally, there is need for the government to proscribe any emerging insurgency related group in the country with immediate effect.

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