Sub-Saharan Political Cultures of Deceit in Language, Literature, and the Media, Volume II

Across National Contexts

Edited by
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Populism as a New Political Tactic of Postcolonial Deceit in Nigerian Contemporary Digital Era

Desmond Onyemechi Okocha and Jesse Ishaku

Introduction

Politics, the world over, is evolving both in its dimension and focus. This is because the advent of the digital media (social media) has actually shaped and redefined how political engagements are being conceived by both the leaders and the led. Social media offers opportunities for individuals to express themselves about social injustices and issues affecting their social well-being through digital activism. According to Moses et al., (2022a, 2022b), while digital activism is a form of online advocacy for human equity, social injustice hampers the citizens' fundamental human

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rights, especially the rights of the proletariats and the downtrodden. Consequently, different societies and countries have tried to adopt a political system that best suits the well-being and betterment of its citizenry. According to Henry (2013), structural improvements which is supposed to be a child of democracy have not been as effective as anticipated in creating the political institutions and leadership agency needed to support social progress. On their part, Okocha and Agbele (2023) observe that, because democracy allows for public engagement, it has developed into a form of government that is crucial to global politics. However, democracy in Nigeria which is supposed to be government of the people, for the people, and by the people according to popular definition is now a mirage or at best, at its embryonic stage. This supports O'Donnell's (2004) claim that, modern democracy is not really by the people, but it is for the people, which emphasizes the significance of social ownership of both political institutions and their outcomes.

According to Okocha and Agbele (2023), in an ideal democracy, citizen engagement is paramount. Be that as it may, politicians in both developed and developing countries (like Nigeria) especially during electioneering campaigns or political debates use to come up with policy statements and manifestos that are usually mouth-watering and endearing to quite a good number of people in the society. For instance, Tijani (2015) states that, President Muhammadu Buhari and his vice president, Yemi Osinbajo and other top members of the party, made lots of promises to Nigerians, upon which they rode gallantly to power. Aesop, a Greek author and Fabulist (620 & 564 BCE) asserts that, "when all is said and done more is said than done." "Despite the constant government rhetoric in their policies for sustainable development, it has continued to shows ineptitude, poor political will, corruption and mismanagement" (Adam et al., 2017).

According to Gildenhuys (1988), the state's responsibility is to ensure that all of its citizens have access to the basics of life, such as housing, healthcare, education, pensions, and protection from losing their employment by fostering an atmosphere that is favorable. Yet, today a new generation of "populists" are making it almost impossible for all these to be achieved. Dunmoye (2003) opines that, accountability has since colonial rule relapsed and a skewed social distribution of resources propelled organized groups to exert pressure against marginalization, however; the larger expectation is that democracy actually prevails more from the bottom than from the top where the political elite is more. Hence, the

public's growing dissatisfaction with the existing situation has increased the discontent with the populists' appeal. Increasing inequality, globalization, and technological progress have made many Nigerians feeling left behind, while horrific terrorism, kidnapping, and banditry particularly in the country's north, cause concern, fear, and uncertainty. This chapter, however, sets out to ascertain whether populism has become a new political tactic in postcolonial Nigeria, identify the relationship between populism, politics, and corruption in Nigeria as well as assess the opportunities for a paradigm shift in populists' movement especially in today's digital era in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

In recent years, according to Eiermann et al. (2017), pivotal political events—including the election of President Donald Trump in the USA, the Brexit vote, the electoral success of Italy's Five Star Movement, Brazil's abrupt turn to the right with the election of President Jair Bolsonaro, and the doubling of support for populist parties throughout Europe—have propelled the term "populism" from the pages of academic journals into the public eye.

Populism frequently develops as a result of legitimate worries about how well institutions and political representation are run in various nations. The appeal of populism, in contrast, frequently stems from genuine worries about how mainstream parties have failed to address issues that affect residents and how institutions have failed to provide policy outcomes that matter to citizens (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Populism can also develop in situations where there have been severe economic setbacks and where broad-based growth will require economic systems to undergo disruptive change. According to Aiginger (2020, pp. 38–42), "populism can range from persuasive politics to a dangerous agenda that creates internal and external conflict, negates climate change and rejects human rights." The decline of political parties that backed Universalist views of human rights gave rise to populism (Urbinati, 2017). Since there seems to be a total deviation from the main essence of the populists' movement globally, this chapter however, seeks to examine whether populism has become a new political tactic in Nigeria where the leaders use it to their advantage to the detriment of the common people whom they vow to protect.

Theoretical Framework

This chapter is hinged on the critical theory. One of the distinctive features of critical theory is critiquing. According to Thompson (2018, pp. 1–14):

> Critical theory is a distinctive form of theory in that it posits a more comprehensive means to grasp social reality and diagnose social pathologies. It is marked not by a priori ethical or political values that it seeks to assert in the world, but by its capacity to grasp the totality of individual and social life as well as the social processes that constitute them. It is a form of social criticism that contains within it the seeds of judgment, evaluation, and practical, transformative activity.

Critical theory questions conventional approaches to examining and interpreting organizational phenomena (Scherer, 2009). Its roots can be traced back to the "Frankfurt School," which produced thinkers like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas. Critical theory's fundamental goal is to expose current forms of oppression and dominance while providing alternatives that would emancipate individuals who were previously marginalized and silenced. Critical theory reveals the dominance, control, and suppression that lie behind things that at first glance seem neutral, necessary, and progressive.

Critical theory suggests inclusivity through the democratization of control and decision-making, thus opens up possibilities for analysis of power, discourse, and historical understandings (Harney, 2014), because it expects emancipatory reflection of transformed social practices (Schroyer, 1973). Contrary to popular belief, critical theory has always focused on the normative validity of human progress, the need to defend the political and cultural values of the enlightened, and through sane and rational consciousness and action (Bronner, 2004). The key insight of a critical theory of society is, therefore, not meant to impose some set of a priori values and ideals onto the social world, but to unravel the contradictions that already exist within it; to make evident an emancipatory insight into the very fabric of what we take as basic to our social world.

The justification for anchoring the study on critical theory is that first, it aims to reveal the dominance, control, and suppression that lie behind things that at first glance seem neutral, necessary, and progressive when in real sense they are not. Secondly, critical theory has always focused on the normative validity of human progress, the need to defend the political and

cultural values of the people through sane and rational consciousness and action. It questions the various power structures that exist in the society, fights the continued endorsement of the prevailing irrational and dominating relations, exposing the selfish interests of the elites while offering emancipatory insights to the situation at hand.

Populism at a Glance

Majority of scholarly works that examine populism start by highlighting how difficult and vague the phrase is. A successful concept-building process, or simply a meaningful discussion about this, is hampered by a number of fundamental issues (Taggart & van Kessel, 2009). Historians have questioned whether the purported populist parties and movements throughout history and in different parts of the world actually share many similarities. It is noteworthy that there is a considerable unwillingness to establish definitions on populism. Canovan (1981, p. 294) cites two common traits of populism but is hesitant to offer a definition—namely, "the exaltation of and appeal to the people and anti-elitism".

Taggart (2000) offered definitions of populism based on six traits: opposition to representative politics, a heartland, a lack of core beliefs; a response to a sense of crisis, self-limitation, and chameleon-like behavior. Also, a number of academics have used comparable concepts to gauge the level of populism present in political parties' or leaders' language (Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2009; Hawkins, 2009; Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn, 2009). However, there is no consensus on how to define populism, but there have been attempts at doing so recently, and there seems to have been a proliferation of this kind of work, which may be due to the heterogeneity of usage. It's also plausible to argue that the term's broad use throughout history and geography is what makes populism so difficult to define.

Even though explanations of populism frequently include elements like an appeal to the "ordinary people" and an anti-elitist critique, they are frequently too vague to accurately identify which actors or groups fall under the populist category. In fact, efforts to do so have only been made more difficult by the fact that a lot of academics use the phrase to refer to a wide variety of political actors without providing a precise or explicit definition of the notion. Furthermore, as Worsley (1969, p. 218) noted over 40 years ago, the fact that movements that are called "populist" rarely identify themselves as such makes things much harder.

Even if experts could agree on the fundamental traits of populism, it is still unknown how it manifests itself. Others argue that populism should be treated as a more fully fledged ideology (Barr, 2009; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008) or as an ideology lacking core values and as a result attaching to other ideologies (Taggart, 2000). Although some scholars use populism to denote a certain personal style or an opportunistic strategy to boost electoral appeal (e.g., Betz, 1994), others argue that populism should be treated as a more fully fledged ideology. This has implications on how populist actors are categorized as well. While populism can be viewed as a tool that can be used by any political actor under the first method, the second approach is more likely to produce a more limited set of populist examples.

Based on the foregoing, since populism is dramatically shifting the global political landscape according to Kyle and Gultchin (2018), politicians cannot begin to provide substantive and trustworthy solutions until they have a thorough understanding of the populism phenomena. However, populism has two main tenets: (1) outsiders, including established elites, are in war with a nation's "real people," and (2) the true people's will should not be constrained. The populace are portrayed as morally decent… economically striving, hardworking, family-oriented, plainspoken, and endowed with common sense, in the words of sociologist Brubaker (2017). Outsiders purportedly do not belong to the moral and hardworking true people. Even though populism always rests on these two fundamental tenets, it can manifest in a variety of ways depending on the situation—cultural, socioeconomic, and anti-establishment populism (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018).

Populists primarily employ three (3) tactics to fan this insider–outsider divide:

1. a political style in which populists identify with insiders;
2. an effort to define and delegitimize outsiders; and
3. a rhetoric of crisis that elevates the conflict between insiders and outsiders as a matter of national urgency.

According to Kyle and Gultchin (2018), from four (4) to twenty (20) populist leaders have gained power globally, a staggering fivefold increase between 1990 and 2018. These nations include not only those in South America, Eastern and Central Europe where populism has historically

been most common, but also those in Asia and Western Europe. Populism is now more prevalent in systemically developed countries than it once was in emerging democracies, where it used to be more common. Be that as it may, according to some academics, "populism has characteristics that make it manipulative by nature, making it a dishonest method of political opportunism that preys on the concerns of the populist constituency" (Betz, 1994, p. 4). Betz further explained populism as largely a political tactic, with speech or rhetoric "intended to harness feelings of resentment and use them strategically" (p. 198).

Politics in Nigeria: Is Populism Becoming New Political Tactic in Nigeria?

Politics in Nigeria has attracted the attention of so many researchers from different disciplines within the art, humanities, and the social and management sciences (such as Henry, 2013; Yagboyaju, 2023). Different approaches have been employed by these researchers both within and outside the country in order to critically explain and understand some of the ideologies of major political parties such as the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC). In their bid to win different political positions in the country, candidates of the PDP, APC and other emerging political parties have employed different political strategies and tactics in order to lure or convince Nigerians to vote for them with the hope of creating a better Nigeria for all. This, for instance, is captured in the words of Adeyemi (2023) when he states that, the survival of the wisest now prevails over that of the fittest for one to win elections in Nigeria. And being the greatest at propaganda might dramatically increase the likelihood of winning the popular vote, which could lead to electoral success. Regrettably enough, both the major parties, that is, the PDP and the APC, have had the opportunity of governing the country at one point or the other but without any remarkable achievement or landmark development which is contrary to their outrageous and fake promises as objectified in their contested mantras—"Power to the People" for the PDP and "Change" for the APC.

Interestingly, the political strategies and tactics as well as the battle cries for the two (2) major political parties in Nigeria—the PDP (Power to the People) and the APC (Change) mantra—have actually worked on the preexisting bias of so many Nigerians. Commenting on Zimbabwe's contemporary political environment, Mavengano (2023) points at

the interaction of language and modern-day African politics. When properly examined, the "Power to the People" mantra of the PDP in over a decade of its leadership was able to convince Nigerians on the need for a switchover from military rule (which is usually characterized as unfriendly, harsh, undemocratic, and anti-people policies) to civilian rule (which is believed to be democratic, friendly and people-oriented). Mavengano and Moyo (2023) contend that political discourse is laden with emotive lexical items which are used to sway the crowds, and yet, the semantic hollowness of such words is profoundly discernible in everyday living conditions of the masses in Africa's postcolonial era. Ojo (2014 & 1994), notes that Nigeria's democratization march has been a cheered one which resulted into concomitant commencement of another round of transition programming, thereby making democratic reforms a tall expectation. Consequently, the "Change" mantra of the APC, on the other hand, promised Nigerians "change" that will fight against endemic corruption, insecurity, inflation, etc. and usher in economic prospects and viability, institutional reforms, etc. There is seemed to be a striking relationship between PDP and APC campaign strategies/tactics and the whole idea of populism which is usually people-centered and anti-elitists. While corroborating, Adeyemi (2023) observes that, most Nigerian politicians used to deploy different propaganda techniques such as name calling and profiling, playing the common man, playing politics with words and the testimonials in order to win elections.

The concept of populism as a political discourse and that of populism as a strategy of political mobilization, according to Jansen (2011, p. 82), try to explain its capacity in luring "ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people." According to Michira (2014), politicians have developed original linguistic styles that depart from commonplace speech. This stance is debatably accurate for Nigeria and many other nations, as it cannot be stressed enough how important word choice is in political campaigns. Politicians have been given a wide range of lexical options over the years, along with their ability to utilize language strategically. While corroborating, Abdel-Moety (2015, p. 8) claimed that, "there is proof that political speech (rhetoric) exhibits power through the clever use of language that helps politicians to control political information". Two of the most important factors for political candidates to succeed in any election campaign are the use of skillful language and the capacity to persuade and impress audiences with

discourse full of thoughts, emotions, and excitement (Jalali & Sadeghi, 2014).

So many dangerous rhetoric of presidents in their bid for populist appeal around the globe have been examined by different researchers. Notable among them, according to Roth (2018), was the assessment of the dangerous rhetoric of the US president, Donald Trump. Trump addressed many Americans' frustration with economic stagnation and a culture that was becoming more and more diverse in a way that violated fundamental notions of dignity and equality, sometimes outright and other times through code and indirection. He (President Trump) made derogatory remarks about immigrants and refugees, attacked a judge for having Mexican descent, made fun of a disabled journalist, denied numerous claims of sexual assault, and promised to limit women's authority over their own fertility. To make matters worse, much of his speech also lacked any real substance (Roth, 2018). The situation with Nigerian presidents is not in any way different from what is obtainable around the world. Ochonu (2018, p. 1) reported that:

> It makes one dizzy trying to keep up with President Buhari's shifting, contradictory rhetoric on herdsmen killings. He has alternated between outright denial of herdsmen's AK-47 possession and suggesting that there could be a new, deadly group of herdsmen, a group with origins outside Nigeria. His position is marked by waffling and confusion. Because he goes back and forth and contradicts himself on this issue, his words have elicited multiple interpretations, and he comes across as unsure of what the problem is, let alone of the solution.

In the same vein, Egbujo (2018) reported that, Obasanjo also asserts patriotism. He makes a democratic credentials claim. He believes that President Buhari has failed beyond repair. Nonetheless, many Nigerians hold opposing opinions. Because they haven't been given better electable choices, many people are stuck with Buhari. Many people are afraid due to history of willful treasury plundering. However, there may be some truth in what Obasanjo is saying. Buhari has disappointed a lot of people. Many believe that, among a pack of wolves, President Buhari is the least corrupt. However, the president may have a clannish demeanor, but many people admire him for rejecting the massive amassing of personal wealth (Egbujo, 2018). According to Egbujo (2018), Obasanjo was observed

at various points attesting to President Buhari's above average performance, but later ordered Buhari not to run in the 2019 elections due to his appalling performance. The reason Nigeria is where it is today is because there has not been any sustained period of good leadership and the nation never placed a priority on developing leaders and establishing moral politics.

Furthermore, Onunaiju (2022) reported that, more than 85% of those who braved the odds of existential social and political perils to support Major General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd.) as president in 2015 were rural peasants, farmers, and urban residents, including artisans, unemployed youths, professionals, and even radical intelligentsia, who have no regard for conventional political or social norms. With the hopes that President Buhari would immediately alleviate their existential problems of poverty, hunger, security, unemployment, and the horrifying and mindless looting of public resources by public officeholders, they toiled, stood in long voting lines, and overcame intimidations and inducements by the People's Democratic Party (PDP), the country's then ruling party (Onunaiju, 2022). President Buhari has been in power for eight years, yet as he prepares to leave, he makes no claims to having accomplished anything in the fields for which millions of Nigerian workers labored to elect him.

It is glaring that populism has become a new political tactic in Nigeria. This is because the term has been used by opportunists who usually take advantage of the masses by posing themselves as "pro-people and anti-elites" especially during electioneering campaigns only for them (politicians) to quickly change from "anti-people to pro-elites" after winning the elections. This assertion is in line with the observation of Betz (1994) when he pointed out that, "populism has characteristics that makes it manipulative by nature, making it a dishonest method of political opportunism that preys on the concerns of the populist constituency" (p.4).

Populism, Politics, and Corruption in Nigeria: The Nexus

The works of Athenian and Roman thinkers held two distinct meanings of corruption, as Buchan and Hill (2014) note. One was the general moral and spiritual deterioration that afflicts citizens without distinction as a result of the gap between empirical realities and the standards by which

they are judged naturally. Later, Ibn Khaldun (Hindess, 2012) and Machiavelli (Burcham & Lyons, 2013; Buchan & Hill, 2014) supported this "naturalist" perspective. The other interpretation was limited and legalistic, that is, "public office corruption"—the use of a position of public trust for personal gain. Scholars over the years abandoned the naturalist tradition in order to concentrate on how to ensure that public employees wouldn't transgress the bounds of their position in order to pursue aims that differed from the public good because their purpose was practical and goal-oriented.

Stanley (2008), Moffitt and Tormey (2014), and others have noted that, populism lacks institutional components that indicate shared goals or a philosophy of governance; it lacks a global or international populist movement; it lacks key theorists or canonical texts; and all of its representations have a local rather than a universal appeal. Populism evolution was associated with the Russian narodniks, who held that revolution would come from the people (narod), and the rural populist politics of the American mid-West (Allcock, 1971). The phrase was once again accepted in connection to McCarthyism at the end of the decade, and it was used widely in Kornhauser's "Politics of Mass Society" to characterize the type of government that develops when democratic forms of representation are not matched by the rule of law. Despite the fact that different scholars have different opinions on populism as a whole, most of their definitional components are still valid today, such as the aim of gaining power for the people as a whole and the usual leadership of intellectuals or the view of the more archaic section of the people as repository of virtue (Mendilow & Phélippeau, 2021). It is the insufficient level of political institutionalization (Kriesi, 2014), pent-up animosity engendered by the negative mimesis toward the reform processes launched… after 1989 and the rejection of the Westernizing Liberal elites (Krastev & Holmes, 2019) as well as the inability of leaders to foster a perception of procedural fairness among others (Lind, 2022).

It can be argued that, social media platforms can serve as a potent tool or avenue for democratic participation and populist movement. Moses et al., (2022a, 2022b) opine that, heightened concerns over the influence of the social media platforms in promoting civic activism and instigating agitations against repressive governments the world over seems to be a welcome development. They, however, contend that, social media have become scapegoats that authorities in developing nations target

for regulation and justify such attempts by emphasizing the relationship between the platforms and national security. According to Agerberg (2017), personal experiences with local facilities (such as healthcare and education) that are thought to be suffering from corruption are a powerful indicator of support for populist causes. Hence, the question that arises is whether populists in power can fulfill their campaign pledges (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015). On the other hand, Curini (2017) investigates how political corruption is used as a wedge issue in large-scale national campaigns. In this context, he draws attention to the fact that populist parties disregard issues that serve the interests of certain groups but rather concentrate on matters that affect "the people" as a whole.

Based on the foregoing, it will be quite imperative to understand the historical evolution of the two (2) main political parties in Nigeria, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC), in order to establish the relationship between populism, politics, and corruption in Nigeria. The PDP was founded in August 1998, and because they have won four of the six presidential elections since Nigeria's return to civilian rule or democratically elected government in 1999, they have comfortably controlled the country's affairs for more than 10 years (Aleyomi, 2013). During its reign, the PDP according to Katsina (2016) did not just experience issues with leadership throughout its time in office, but has also had a lack of clear ideological beliefs that might have directed its government and provided direction for its members serving in public offices.

After ousting the PDP in 2015 due to its' highly monetized politics, individualistic inclinations of its politicians, incoherent party doctrines, and party defection among other things, the APC—considered as Nigeria's strongest opposition—managed to create a president for the first time (Olowojolu, 2015). Consequently, the APC was created in February 2013 when three equally potent opposition political parties in Nigeria merged as a result of the PDP's ongoing and seemingly unstoppable political power. The PDP's subsequent failure may be related to the party's poor performance in Nigerian administration and lack of willpower to address issues bothering on corruption, Boko haram insurgency, kidnapping and banditry, embezzlement/misappropriation of public funds, insecurity, etc. However, the APC administration which poses itself as Nigerians' messiah have been equally adjudged by so many indexes and researchers as one of the worst dispensation in the history of

Nigeria. This situation is in line with the observation of Kossow (2019) and Müller (2016) who try to show the relationship between populism and corruption. The former claims that corrupt individuals simply exploit populist language as a deception to further their agendas, while the latter contends that the association between populism and corruption is the result of an ideological presupposition.

Populism in Nigeria: Could There Be Opportunities for a Paradigm Shift?

Populism in Nigeria has not actually yielded the desired result as it has been seen to be counter-productive which is contrary to popular belief that it is people-oriented. This situation actually calls for a paradigm shift and transformation in leadership style especially in nascent democracy like Nigeria. Both the term "paradigm shift" and the concept of "transformational leadership" emphasize change that is going in the correct direction for societal renewal. The term paradigm shift refers to a hypothesis that was first seriously considered in Thomas Kuhn's key work, the "Structure of Scientific Revolution" (1962). It describes a change from business as usual to a tangible radicalization of circumstances and attitudes. While having a scientific origin, the term "paradigm shift" has been used by a variety of disciplines to refer to a large and dramatic departure from the social "norm." In Nigeria, for instance, during the 2023 general elections, electorates on different social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were seen to have posted/tweeted how they came out in their numbers to vote for the candidate of their choice because they are tired with the government of President Muhammadu Buhari. According to Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2019), tweets have evolved from being only informational bites to being involved in processes of political, diplomatic, and journalistic interaction. Moreover, because it involves both political players and the general public, such communication is no longer the domain of the informed.

To this end, Kuhn (1962) promotes paradigm shift, a movement that creates a new, innovative, and transformative landscape in our society, as he asserts that the limiting, normative perspective of textbooks and science limit our awareness of revolutionary tendencies in the human world. According to the Kuhnian viewpoint, paradigm shift is revolutionary in the fullest sense of the word (Sosteric, 2005). With its ontological distinctiveness, transformational leadership in the Kuhnian sense

(Everman, 2006) bothers on finding an alternative leadership style or model while building on Nigeria's budding democratic culture. Bernard Bass lists four interconnected elements that he believes are essential for leaders to take followers into transformational leadership in his explanation of how leaders create the ties required to make transformational leadership possible. Bass (1985) expanded on James McGregor Burns' idea of transformational leadership, which at first leaned toward political leadership, by establishing four essential components for preparing people for change. Bass (1985) suggests the following elements as important for transformational leadership. These elements are essential for bringing about change in Nigeria's political system.

1. Intellectual stimulation: In Bass' concept, intellectual stimulation refers to a leader's capacity to influence and alter his followers' perceptions of problems, awareness of them, and solutions through the use of their intellectual engagement. The approach to the mind, according to Soyinka, is not the path of the blade or the bullet but rather the unseen, yet palpable path of dialogue, which may be difficult but eventually ensures the expansion of our private social beings (Soyinka, 2002). This is because by involving followers in the decision-making process, intellectual stimulation encourages them to come up with innovative ways to effect change. By including followers in the process of decision-making and problem-solving that will affect their social, economic, environmental, and political well-being, intellectual stimulation encourages followers to consider new techniques and means to bring about transformation.

2. Inspirational motivation: Leaders look on inspirational motivation appeal to energize the populace and increase their awareness of the consequences of acting improperly. Such leaders ought to be able to motivate their followers to envision the world as they want it to be in the future. The motivational aspect in this context denotes a leadership style in Nigeria that will communicate a powerful, fearsome vision of the future by imagining how to transfer the current populist key ingredients into reality.

3. Idealized influence: This characteristic puts into perspective transformational leaders that serve as examples for followers. Followers will be motivated by leaders who are transparent, and they will ultimately mimic such leaders and internalize their ideas and manner of operation for the rebirth of society. Burns thinks that for optimal influence

to occur, leaders and followers must develop real trust. The charisma or idealized impact of the leadership should be characterized by high moral and ethical standards if it is to be truly transformational. Without a strong moral and ethical foundation, true transformative leadership will be difficult to achieve for both the leader and the followers. Essentially, charismatic leadership is involved here. Doing outstanding acts and deeds that inspire followers to be committed to helping leaders to realize their goals and dreams are referred to as charismatic leadership. According to Nadler and Tushman (1989), charismatic leadership or idealized influence is characterized by three essential characteristics: envisioning, enabling, and energizing.

4. Individualized consideration: According to Bass' contention in this section of his philosophy, leaders treat each follower as an individual and offer coaching, mentorship, a sense of purpose, vision, and opportunity for personal development. This strategy satisfies each person's demand for self-actualization, self-fulfillment, and self-worth while simultaneously educating the next generation of leaders. It also naturally encourages followers to achieve more and advance in the field of self-development.

Conclusion

The idea of populism which actually evolved from developed countries is presently being adopted and used in different developing countries which Nigeria is not an exception. This is because it is believed to meet the hopes, aspirations and yearnings of the masses when properly adopted and utilized. Unfortunately, populism in most of the nascent democracy, like Nigeria, seems to be counter-productive as it has failed to provide the desired results. Leaders, who are supposed to be populists, acting for the people as against the elites are seen to have only adopted the populist appeal especially during electioneering campaigns just to grab the seats they have been vying for in order to fulfill their personal, selfish and parochial interests as against the people's interests.

There is no doubt that politicians in Nigeria have actually adopted populism as a new political tactic/strategy in securing political seats. However, just as the concept is evolving over the years, the masses are equally beginning to understand how manipulative and misleading the whole idea of populist movement is, and how it has negatively affected

their societies and dashed the hopes and aspiration of the common man in diverse ways. Consequently, people are revolting against the status quo because they believe it to be fundamentally defective and have failed to serve the interests of the people. It, therefore, becomes quite imperative to take the issues that gave rise to populism seriously in order to develop a meaningful political ideology that can be truly pro-people and anti-elitists.

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