

TERRORISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INSIGHT INTO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY INTERPRETATION OF THE BOKO-HARAM SECT IN NORTHERN NIGERIA.

BOT, P. M.¹ DAFOM, M. P.² PWAJOK, J. Y.³ GOSHIT N. J.³

¹Department of Political Science Bingham University Karu

²Department of Psychology Plateau State University Bokkos

³Department of Psychology University of Jos

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a fresh insight to domestic terrorism in Northern States of Nigeria which affects the entire Nigerian polity. Having in the past crushed the terror of the Maitasine sect, the emergence of the Boko Haram sect in 2002 spelt doom to our fledgling democracy and posing a challenge to national security. The paper adopted a qualitative method of analysis which relies on secondary material and will seek explanation of terrorism in line with the domestic terrorist group (Boko-Haram), within the context of Marxian political economy and frustration-deprivation theories. Thus, it argues that until the economic position of the people is secured, where social welfare of the people is improved, and where individuals are motivated to achieve life ambitions and fulfill destiny, frustration sets in, and then security remains elusive. Therefore the paper recommend genuine anti-poverty strategies through good governance.

Keywords: Terrorism, National Security, Political Economy, Boko-haram

INTRODUCTION

'Terrorism' which has led to varying human rights abuses is today a global phenomenon that is threatening the basis of nation-states structures of stability and self preservation rights of human kind. It is no news that human life is of less significance that blowing it in a most cruel, senseless and perfidious manner of "man's inhumanity to man" really justifies their course. Although the end of the cold war elicited broad human rights concerns to the extent that they take centre stage not only in nation's foreign policies, but also in the world political arena as a whole. The issue of terrorism has remained and continues to pose challenges to the international community and nation-states domestic affairs as it is increasingly impacting negatively on nation's foreign images.

Less than 12 hours after the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush the former President of the United States of America (U.S.A) proclaimed the start of the global war on terror, where he acknowledged that, "we are all faced with a generational challenge" (Gregory, 2005), which required nation-states to lock-horns and fight this social menace. The President's

proclamation on war against terrorism was lauded and at the same time gained legitimacy and justification in the international community, as many countries considered it to be their international obligation to fight terrorism.

This peculiar act (terrorism) of criminality ranges from suicide bombing (September 11, 2001) to kidnapping of individuals which have gained prominence in Nigeria (Niger-Delta the oil rich zone in Nigeria). Irrespective of the factors that gave rise to terrorism, to be more specific in Northern Nigeria, the major challenge at the moment is on how to tackle the dastardly acts of the Boko-Haram sect that is every day capturing the news headlines.

While the group was able to capitalize on Nigeria's widespread poverty, the slim economic opportunities make the youth easy target for any radical and dangerous ideology like that of the Boko-Haram. Corruption in Nigeria has resulted to a very huge dislocation of every facet of life- from police abuse, human rights violation, lack of basic infrastructural facilities to poor governance that deepens inequality, poverty, unemployment and the escalation of ethno-religious tensions for the gains of the local elites. These spates of failed development combined creates a climate of desperation and deprivation of significant material existence of the people in Nigeria (especially the North), which forms a perfect recipe for the growth and sustenance of terrorism. Although President Good Luck Jonathan's administration inherited the Boko-Haram problem when he assumed office in May 2010, he has taken several steps to solve the problem, such as creating a special joint military task force to eliminate the menace, installing numerous closed circuit televisions throughout the federal capital territory Abuja and other measures in various state. Yet the spate of violence by the group, even with the death of the Boko-Haram kingpin, worsen. Which is evidence in the group's resumption to a vigorous new and robust dimension of a large scale bombing, maiming and destruction of lives and public properties. This dimension of domestic violence or terrorism captures clearly in a poignant way what Renner (1996 p.53) calls the changing character of security when he states that:

The cold war obscured the wider meaning of security by concentrating narrowly on military concerns and often assuming the threat to be from outside the borders. In this post war period, problems that seem distant like environmental degradation, uncontrolled population growth and mass movement of refugees have come to the fore. Threats today are more likely to arise from unarmed hungry, unemployed, and deeply divided people.

The above view neatly depicts the changing character of security that shows reliance on the military as the foundation of national security. This has changed, as it is no longer adequate. This is because exclusive focus on the military factor to the neglect of other factors such as equitable resources distribution, fairness in the political representation, environmental safety, economic opportunities and even development could only widen the frontiers of national vulnerability. In support of the above Nweke (1989 p.2) says that; "a state is secure only when the aggregate of the people organized under it has a consciousness of belonging to a common sovereign political freedom, enjoy equal human rights, economic opportunities, e.t.c. Thus, security ought to be appreciated beyond military protection of state territorial integrity and interest (Buzan, 1997 p.5).

Therefore, it's sad to note that from president Olusegun Obasanjo's administration in 1999, to late President Umaru Shehu Yar'addua, to still President GoodLuck Jonathan, Nigeria still groans in the woods with no near sight of hope to transform the nation. A glimpse into the

bottomless pit of despondent system gets one dizzy. Each successive government in the past came with vigorous and pleasant promises to salvage the country from the brim of collapse. But no sooner than the regime or administration began, that a year or two got them unable to perform, and the next action was concocting excuses to justify their failures.

Against this backdrop, the paper examines the challenges of terrorism in light of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria as it affects national security. Gleans the history of terrorism, conceptualize terrorism and security, and how in other words, the spates of various dimensions of terrorism affect the political economy of Nigeria. The paper will also suggest ways in tackling this social menace where at the end policy options will be drafted.

METHODOLOGY

Considering the nature and implications of research in this field, the study will rely heavily on the analysis of secondary sources of data. Although the method of data analysis is qualitative, however in view of the current security situation in the North East as well as the difficulty of accessing potential respondents with a commanding knowledge or understanding of terrorism, in the area, the research will benefit from desk reviews of previous research papers and content analysis of Newspapers and Magazines. Qualitative study methodology provides tools for researchers to study complex phenomena within their contexts. And when the approach is applied correctly, it becomes a valuable method for researchers to develop theory, evaluate programs, and develop interventions (Baxter and Jack, 2008).

CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY

TERRORISM:

One of the challenges of examining terrorism is that there is no widely accepted definition. This is not just a problem of semantics. It has affected initiatives to establish treaties and other international efforts to combat terrorism (Rourke, 2007 p. 315). "The simple fact is that terrorism means different things to different people". We couldn't find a common political ground on several issues- despite the fact that the entire world is preoccupied with international terrorism".

Golder and Williams (2004 p.272) observe that the lack of consensus on the definition of the concept 'terrorism' points to its inescapably political nature, perhaps best encapsulated in the aphorism that 'one person's terrorism is another person's freedom fighter'. Thus, terrorists are normally triggered by some of opposition, real or imagined which precedes the terror act that allows the perpetrators to rationalize their actions.

While recognizing this lack of consensus, it is however, important to establish how the word is used here. Terrorism is 1. Violence; 2. Carried out by individuals, non-governmental organizations, or covert government agents or units; that 3. Specifically targets civilians, 4. Uses clandestine attack methods, such as car bombs and hijacked airliners; and 5. Attempt to influence politics. (Rourke op.cit:316). This definition stresses that terrorism focuses on harming some people in order to create fear in others by targeting civilians and facilities or systems (such as transportation) on which civilians rely. Basically the objective of terrorists is not just killing and wounding people and destroying physical material. Instead the true

target is the emotions of those who see or read about the act of violence and become afraid or dispirited.

Various analysts such as (Ogundele, 2008; Osaghae, 1995; Dagne, 2006; Scott, 2007; Cohen, 2008) have used rebels, insurgents, militants, terrorists, freedom fighters e.t.c. to describe the concept. The very diversity of views reflects the enormous variety of efforts to understand and describe the problem. This is why the scholars of foreign policy issues argue that in other regions of the world, including the middle-east, analysts share different opinions regarding such groups. For instance, while the US has labeled the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, a pro-Syrian movement, reportedly funded by Iran, as a terrorist group, the European Union (EU) on the other hand, resists the pressure to outlaw Hezbollah a terrorist group (Cohen, 2008).

However, conceptualization is better understood in the context of trends and patterns, and based on the tactic and strategy the perpetrators employ. At first glance, the Boko-Haram crisis was seen as a political bugaboo. Until recently when a day hardly passes by without one bomb blast or shooting or killing innocent civilians that more attention was devoted to the issue after so many lives would've been terminated.

According to Burton (1979 p.11), terrorism includes a range of social and political problems whose behavioural scope is boundless and includes behavior that appears to be abnormal. Furthermore, an unconventional political violence or the threat of political violence meant to have an impact on both the immediate victims and the audience that carried out by non-state actors and, or clandestine state agents (Brown, 2007 p.30).

Brown points out clearly the direction that non-state-actors[and/or] clandestine state agents' use illegal explosive devices to perpetrate 'unconventional political violence' meant to create impact on both the assumptions that, the activities of the Boko-Haram sect in the North constitute 'a form of political behaviour, resulting from the deliberate choice of basically rational actor[s]', the sect use illegally acquired arms to engage in an unconventional warfare in order to sidestep the limits placed on them by the federal government.

In specific terms, terrorism has a connotation of evil, indiscriminate violence or brutality. To label a group or action as terrorist is to seek to suggest that the actors or the violence is immoral, wrong or contrary to obvious basic ethical principle that any reasonable beings might hold.

In some context, terrorism may be conceived as freedom fighters, revolutionaries, rebels, resistance fighters, members of democratic opposition or national liberation soldiers (Enders and Sandler 2006; Lutz and Lutz 2006b, 2008). Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to instill fear for political ends. In the later part of the 20th-21st centuries, the phenomenon grew in popularity as one of the features of world politics and conflicts that seeks maximum and urgent attention of political leaders. Hitherto, terrorism is used by individuals, single minded groups, state agents and broad insurgent movements to seek some political and military results perhaps considered difficult or impossible to achieve in the usual political forum or on the battle field against an army (Harmon, 2000). Just exactly the direction in which the Boko-Haram sects have adopted illegality to prove their points to Nigerians.

In the same manner, Walter (1972) argues, that terrorism is not only confined to anomalous

circumstances or exotic systems; it is also potential in ordinary institutions as well as in unusual situations. It has been variously described as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination.

Often times, those who are accused of being terrorists rarely identify themselves as such, instead, they use terms that represent their ideological or ethnic struggle such separatists, freedom fighters, guerrillas, Jihadi, Revolutionaries e.t.c. historically, the concept 'terrorism' dates back to the first organized human interactions. For instance, when the Jewish Zealots used terrorism to resist the Romans by killing many Roman soldiers and destroying property. Also, the Muslims used terrorism to fight each other (Shiites versus Sunnis) and against the crusaders. It was a period in the religious circle when dying in the service of God, dying while killing the assumed enemies of Allah loomed large (Rapport, 1984).

Merari (1994) sees terrorism as the use of violence by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents for obtaining political (including social and religious) goals especially when the violence is intended to intimidate or otherwise affect the emotions, attitudes and behaviour of a target audience considerably larger than the actual victims.

Wilkinson (1994) opines that as a type of unconventional warfare, terrorism is designed to weaken or supplant existing political landscapes through capitulation, acquiescence or radicalization as opposed to subversion or direct military action.

Significantly, terrorism is a compulsive strategy of the relatively disadvantaged, the weak who seek reversal of authority, and efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy, a theatrical warfare whose drama involves the actors who usually carry out the violent act is targeted and the authority due to be influenced or compelled to act.

Therefore, different strategies can be employed by different, unrelated groups of terrorist. Strategy in this context is the considered application of means to advance one's ends objectives. This depends largely on the circumstances and the terrorist intentions.

Harmon (2000) identifies some of the terrorists strategies which include, strategy to create or further a sense of societal dislocation, fear and even anarchy; strategy to discredit, diminish, or to destroy a particular government and replace it with another economic strategy which is intended to directly harm the property owners and perhaps to vitiate the economic policies and programmes of government particular in the areas of sabotage of oil pipelines, bombing, bank robberies and disrupting the export of manufactured goods and strategy for international effect (such groups that employ these tactics include the Niger-Delta militants). While the Boko-haram is perhaps contemptuous of the society's political institutions and practices (Slann, 1998), wanton destruction of innocent lives, public properties and bombing of worship centres are their signature.

In totality, terrorism whether domestic or international, is fundamentally political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of political power to achieve political change.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Wolfers (1952 p.451) described national security "as ambiguous symbol." Just as there is no generally acceptable definition of it as Ocheche and Bashir (1989 p.301) perceived it as a "

rather vague and hazy concept which has not been sufficiently articulated and conceptualized".

However, Waltz (1979) Stresses the fact that the anarchical nature of international system makes it a matter of practical necessity for states to look out for their protection and survival in the system. He describes the system as a self help system in which each state must take adequate and effective measures to provide for its own security largely conceived in the terms of territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty proponents of this perspective argue that nation-states compete for many of the same things including self preservation, national identity, sovereignty, status and wealth which are acutely scarce.

It is therefore, the acute scarcity of this identified value in the preceding that provides strong motivation for sovereign states to amass as much military power as they can. Security in these contexts, is largely perceived as a function of power is a demonstration of awesome military capability.

The cold war era conceptualization of national security perceived in terms of the amassment of military armaments and personnel. Hence John Mroz defines national security as the "relative freedom from harmful threats" which was to be achieved by a state by the amassment of frightening war heads and thousands of soldiers.

Opposing the view above by Gurt, argues that for a state to feel secure, it has to worry more about its immediate political and strategic environment because the anger of possible threats to, or infringement on its independence and security, encompasses many non military actions as well (Gurt, 1985:131).

Therefore, it is imperative to note that, the security of any social system is not necessarily a function of its military power but essentially the aggregate of both military and non military factors. This more encompassing definition which now accommodates social, economic, cultural, technology and political variables in the addition to its military variables, has swiftly substituted the much emphasis on military hardware as national security. Thus, the reality is that a country overshadowed with high rate of unemployment, political instability, poverty, hunger, disease, population exploitation, environmental degradation e.t.c. cannot be secured.

Hence, Robert McNamara brilliantly asserts that:

Any society that seeks to achieve adequate military security against the background of acute food shortages, population explosion, low level of productive and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and chronic unemployment, has a false sense of security (McNamara, 1968 p.149).

He further observed that:

Security is development and without development there can be no security, a developing nation that does not develop, simply cannot remain secured for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature...

In support of McNamara, Luckham (1993 p.203) expressed dissenting opinion against the dominant tendency of viewing security as "a function of the military power" it amounts to a fallacy of single factor to focus on military as one and only variable that matters in security calculation he further argues:

It is not just the physical survival of the mass of people which is an issue, but also the satisfaction of their basic needs for food, health, clothing, shelter. Any kind of security that ignores or violates the aspiration of the great masses of the people deserves another vocabulary.

BOKO-HARAM: ANOTHER BIRTH OF TERROR IN NIGERIA

The group Boko-Haram didn't just conjure up, has been around for some time, as long as ten or fifteen years, and had operated under different names in the past. Such names included Ahlusunna wal' Jamma Hijra; the Nigerian Taliban; and the Yusufiyya (Fasure 2009: 2; Omipidan 2009b: 48; Sunday Tribune 2009). Indeed, its leader Yusuf claimed to be part of the Shiites under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky originally, and when the Kano-based The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria 99 Jama'atul Tajdidi Islam (JTI) of Abubakar Mujahid broke away from the Shiites in the 1990s, Yusuf also became a member of the JTI and was even the Amir (leader) of JTI for Borno State (Suleiman 2009: 19-23). The Shiites, also known as the Islamic Society of Nigeria, emerged in Nigeria in the late 1970s under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky.

Its objective is the establishment of an Islamic state governed by the Sharia through preaching and subtle influence on society. It also sympathizes with the state of Palestine and abhors Israel and the United States of America. The Shiites did not hide their disdain for the state police and the judiciary, both of which it considers instruments of Satan (Olugboji 1995:6). Although this sect is elitist and appears less dangerous than either the Maitatsine or the Boko Haram movements, its goal is revolutionary/reformist and its members could resort to carrying arms or engaging in armed conflict if the sect's present strategies of preaching and exerting subtle influence on society do not work. Its predisposition to violence, even when not professed, and as seen in its clashes with other Islamic groups, is pertinent. For instance, the Shiites engaged their breakaway group, the Yan Tauri – and other Muslims it considered liberal – in violent confrontation in 1996 and 1997, among other instances. Also, the Shiites' regular clashing with policemen during their processions and anti-West protests is an indicator of what the group is capable of (Albert, 1999a pp. 286-288; Akhaine and Abua 2009 pp.1-2).

Yusuf's revolutionary transformation, borne out of his long-term dream of reforming society, could explain the radicalization of the group under his leadership, the group having assumed a hard-line position after its erstwhile leader, Abubakar Lawal, left to study at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia (Oyegbile and Lawal 2009 pp.68). A different claim was that Yusuf left the Taliban because of its extremist tendencies but vowed that his group would not relent until an "independent and a just State devoid of anything haram (ungodly or sinful) had been established" (Omipidan 2009a pp. 43-44). It would appear that Yusuf prepared himself for the leadership role that he later played in the Boko Haram sect with his membership in other fundamentalist groups. It is also not impossible that the Boko Haram sect was just one facet of the multifaceted and well-linked fundamentalist movement, the true extent of which has yet to be fully determined.

The first attempts at imposing a religious ideology on a secular, independent Nigeria, marked the beginning of ferocious conflict and crises in Nigeria (Isichei 1987 pp.194-208; Ibrahim 1997 pp.511-512) Following the Part II Section 10 of the 1999 Constitution states

expressly that "the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion" (see <<http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>>).

the name "Boko Haram" came from the external view of its basic beliefs: "which is derived from a combination of the Hausa words "Boko" meaning western education and the Arabic word "Haram" which is something forbidden, ungodly or sinful. Characteristically, the sect not only opposed but outrightly rejected Western education, Western culture and modern science. Alternatively, it embraced and advocated the propagation of and strict adherence to Islam by all and sundry regardless of anyone's personal wishes. In line with this objective, the sect sought to impose Sharia across all Nigerian states (Bumah and Adelokun, 2009 p.40; National Life, 2009).

paradoxically, Yusuf, the sect leader, enjoyed the best that Western technology offered in the form of exotic cars, the latest communication equipment and the best medical services. In addition, his desire to fully prepare for his jihad encouraged his sending people abroad for medical training, a development that alienated some of his members (Madunagu, Shobiye and Chiedozi, 2009 p.2).

The sect's membership cut across the broad spectrum of society, but a preponderant number of members came from its poorest groups. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, students, bankers, a former commissioner and other officers of Borno State, membership extended to drug addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people. Although the common denominator among all members was their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, (Bwala, 2009 p. 3; Omipidan 2009a pp.43-44; Olu 2009 p.9). which subtly made them enamored by extreme and average muslims mostly of the enclave. The group has drawn support financially from within Nigeria. Although many of them are not yet known, the support of Alhaji Buji Foi, a former commissioner in Borno State, is commonly acknowledged. There were also other speculated sponsors, from prominent religious leaders to businessmen from the North. Motivations for such support could include belief in the sect's cause, desire to promote religion, or sowing the seeds for future reciprocity of goodwill. through their support, they became part of the Islamist agenda to launch a revolution that would entrench Islamic doctrines and practices in Nigeria like the jihadist organizations outside the country.

Fundamentally, The role that partisan politics and political patronage play in the sustenance of the sect cannot be overlooked. With the introduction of "Political Sharia" in some Northern states beginning in 1999 encouraged closeness between Yusuf and some of the ruling and/or aspiring politicians as their decision aligned with his plan to promote strict adherence to Islamic law. But to his utmost disappointment the type of Sharia that was introduced across some Northern state fell short of his standards. Which perhaps made him believed that the politicians only floundered religion for their selfish motives, therefore not serious or their knowledge of western education is hindering their maximum commitment to the cause of Islam.

In addition, his fraternization with the political class possibly informed his willingness to use his group to assist the political elite to secure political power that would, in turn, be used to protect and possibly advance his career (Omipidan, 2009a p.44). The disappointment he felt following his abandonment by the political elite could have hastened his desire to effect a

change through violence. Or it could be that the failure to attack the Sharia-based law to social welfare schemes – with the dividends of Sharia seemingly not forthcoming, radicals thus had the opportunity to step in and demand a fully beneficial Islamic state (McConnell, 2009).

When the fact that the Maitatsine riots broke out during the tenure of a civilian president in 1980 is considered, the link to Yusuf's rise to political patronage could be understood. The thesis that politicians who patronize religious leaders, either for support or protective charms, use them as a tool and later discard them or unleash them on innocent people best describes Yusuf's situation (Adam al Ilory, 2009 p.23). Most of those who backed violent and revolutionary sects were politicians who needed the sect members' violent disposition to achieve their political and, by extension, economic ends (Muogbo, 2009).

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA AND BOKO-HARAM SECT

Apart from the changes in leadership structure, the post-colonial Nigerian state did not make any significant difference from the colonial state. The colonial political economy provided the material and the institutional foundation for the development of the post-colonial Nigeria. The transition from colonial to post-colonial economy and society led to changes in class relations with their attendant contradictions (Williams, 1976). The character of this contradiction is seen in its creation of the series of regional and ethnic platforms that continued to gain relevance and ascendancy even in the post-colonial period.

Independence eliminated the upper stratum of colonial bourgeoisie, and produced a ruling class with relatively weak economic base, which therefore gravitated towards the state in order to achieve economic power. Since wealth was largely associated with government office, politics is centered on competition for positions, and political activities were directed at accessing state power and authoritative allocation of revenue and patronage connected to it... (Graf, 1988). They were (elites) groomed to think, behave and carry on the legacies of the colonial masters, although they occupied big positions but they lack the where withal to drive the country politically and economically to success, just as Fanon (1963) rightly observed; these members of the national bourgeoisie are not creative and are intellectually unproductive. This makes them to be unable to know how to put the economy in motion towards the human and material development. This is clearly captured in his view that "... The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an under-developed middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace..." (Fanon, 1963).

Another contributory factor was the expatriates' domination of the investment opportunities and sources of capital accumulation. This inhibited the accumulation and reinvestment of capital by the Nigerian investors who were not economically strong to compete with the foreign investors and multinational corporations. These inability to compete made the Nigerian investors to become mere intermediaries between the foreign entrepreneurs and the Nigerian state, or, were finally made to turn to the state as a source of capital. This results in an increased intervention of the state in investment and entrepreneurship, which in turn arrogates to the state and the members of the political class a huge advantage of monopoly over economic investments and highly profitable contracts. Given the fact of this increased

state intervention, "politics has become the primary source of capital accumulation by Nigerians"(Gavin,1977:284).This opportunistic access to, and accumulation of money raised some opportunistic professionals and bureaucrats to have an advantage over the people and thus form the bourgeoisie class in the post-colonial Nigeria. Whose focus was and still in milking the country dry.

In a nutshell, the structure of the Nigerian economy reveals its precarious nature notwithstanding its position as the third largest economy on the continent after South Africa and Egypt. The most noted of the absurdities is the over-reliance of the economy and its fate on one sector (the oil industry) and on one commodity export (crude-oil). Hardly could anything be written about the political economy of Nigeria without reference to its history of oil production.

Whether inspired by the poor socio-economic credential of the north, or a fundamentalist ideological religious group trained by al-Qaeda, or an instrument fabricated by some selfish political elites in protest of power shift from the north. The fact remains, a 'monster' is born. Who understands nothing less but a blood instruction to destroy its victims in order to communicate to the appropriate political authority. Boko-Haram is an Islamic religious sect in the Northern Nigeria. Its emergence and activities are inspired by perverse spiritual claims that are hostile to western education and any interaction with the western society which they considered a sin. According to John Campbell, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria said: "Boko-Haram is a way of thinking, they are a loosely organized grassroots insurrection against not only the Abuja government but the traditional Muslim establishment as well". The characteristics of the organizational operations of the Boko-Haram sects emanate with the defining features of a typical fundamentalists group. The ring-leader of the Boko-Haram group known as Ustaz Yusuf Mohammed was killed on 30th July, 2009 while trying to escape from custody after a battle with the Nigerian police force.

The political goal of Boko Haram is to create an Islamic nation in the 12 northern states of Nigeria, eventually spreading to the rest of the country. From its inception, Boko Haram viewed Nigeria as a state run by non-believers and made the government its main target—even when the country had a Muslim President. With Islamic nation in place and leadership, the economic will then be centered on the sharia concept of a welfare state.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Virtually all these crises, many of which took a violent form, have been explained or justified by one reason or the other. Where the crisis was not borne out of the need to curb the excesses of some groups, prevent them from being a security threat, or contain their spread – as was the case with the Maitatsine riots (Albert 1999a, pp.285-286; Ladan 1999 pp.101) – it arose out of social and economic recess and attendant deprivations (Muhammed and Adeoye 2006); and in particular to the harsh socio-economic conditions forcing the productive elements of Nigeria to idleness, making them ready tools for religious and ethnic violence. For instance, Obateru (1999), makes the point that poverty accounts for the bulk of violence due to such problems as unemployment, inadequate housing and social infrastructure. Sanusi (2007 p.183) on the other hand indicates that "...poverty and deprivation in the North are the lots of both Christians and Muslims, and the widespread frustration has been the major reason for conflicts. This is further espoused by former CBN Governor chukwuma

Soludo in a paper titled, *Nigerian economy: can we achieve the vision 2020?* That inspite of the tripling of the country's GDP and resultant reduction in the incidence of poverty in the country by almost 25 percent, the three geo-political zones in the North has, and by large been excluded from this growth. Below is a table showing the comparative indices of poverty in the six geo-political zones and ten Northern States with the highest index of poverty in the country and the percentages of their populations living under the poverty line.

Table 1 shows the index of poverty in some Northern States in Nigeria

State	Percentage
Jigawa	95.0%
Kebbi	89.7%
Kogi	88.6%
Bauchi	86.86%
Kwara	85.2%
Yobe	83.3%
Zamfara	80.9%
Gombe	77.0%
Sokoto	76.89%
Adamawa	71.1%

Table 2 shows the index of poverty base on Geo-political zones in Nigeria

Geo-political zone	Percentage
South-east	26.75%
South-south	35.06%
South-west	43.01%
North-central	66.97%
North-west	71.17%
North-east	72.16%

From the table 1 and 2 it means that extreme poverty is essentially a Northern phenomenon. There are indeed the crises of poverty in Northern Nigeria. While Diamond observed that mass poverty breeds different forms of extremism, religion inclusive, Ojo (2006 p.376) has pointed out that the failure of [liberal] democracy to yield economic returns have increased the possibilities of ethno-religious violence in the country.

However, one may be pruned to ask whether poverty necessarily and essentially provoked ethnic and religious violence in Northern Nigeria leading to the kind of domestic terror-type incidence experienced by Nigerians in the North? If that is the case, why then is this perpetuated in only certain Northern Nigerian cities and less so in even poorer urban centres with more lumpened populations, and indeed with higher concentration of religionists elsewhere? Why do these violence tend to be ignited by Islamic fundamentalist groups in the North for example the Boko-Haram? Although the point, however, is that mass poverty in itself is a motivating factor that will deeply complicate any conflict, but not all poor societies experience violent conflict and poverty in itself is not a sufficient explanatory factor for violence.

Also, the political economy approach rooted in Marxian political economy with proponents like Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, V.I. Lenin, e.t.c. all agree with Marx's thesis on "Historical Materialism" that conflicts are mostly tied to economic structures and social institutions.

The main argument is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organized. The theory explains problems like political and economic exclusion, injustice, poverty, disease, exploitation, inequity e.t.c. as sources of tensions in the society. They also blamed capitalism for being an exploitative system based on its relations of production and the division of the society into two-bourgeoisie and proletariat. To them the exploitation of the lower class [proletariat] under capitalism creates conflict.

Therefore, it can be said that the negligence of this lower class of proletariat by the political bourgeoisies to deliver public goods and security (as in- food, employment, shelter, education, health e.t.c) is the reason behind the insecurity in the country:

In essence, therefore, the process of decomposition of the state, characterized by chaotic management of the economy, institutional decay, and the inability of the state to provide the basic socio-economic and security needs of the people, was simultaneously accelerating the emergence of contending loci of power organized around identity politics Jega (2003 p.31).

This certainly explains the decomposition of the state, which resulted in its decay, a loss of focus and the ability to respond to the needs and yearnings of the populace via its failure from the delivery of social provisioning or public goods.

Advancing this position, Nigerian political economy analysts opine that the Nigerian state is prebendal, rentier (dependent on external and other rents and royalties), patrimonial (a blurred distinction between the private and public domains and personalization of the state) and authoritarian (excessive application of power and authority rather than consensus) (Jega, 2000).

Gofwen (2004:146) and Sanusi (2007) both contend that, religious conflicts result from the long term socio-economic effects of various economic reforms such as Obasanjo's austerity measures and economic reforms, Shehu Shagari's ethical revolution, Muhammadu Buhari's economic stabilization measures, Ibrahim Babangida's IMF-World Bank supported structural adjustment programme, and economic reforms, on the urban poor in dislocation and destruction of livelihoods generates the pool of disenchanting, alienated and marginalized populations. To Sanusi the period from 1986 reduced over 90 percent of Nigerians to living below the so-called poverty line and "the general economic situation is therefore a major factor contributing to religious crisis". Bako (1992) and Egwu (1999) also highlight the relationship between structural adjustment and ethnicity in rural Nigeria.

Thus, it can be established that it was only in the period of economic crisis and structural adjustment that the most negative and damaging aspects of identity mobilization and identity politics, with serious consequences on the political economy, came to prominence..... (Jega,2000 p.27).

Hence nibbling the insurgence of the Boko-Haram sect to a religious factor, is completely reductionist and a surface scratch to a deep-seated phenomenon. One should be able to look beyond for a vivid glimpse. For many crisis in northern Nigeria are only worn the toga of religion but beyond that, systemic factors prevail.

THE COST OF BOKO-HARAM TO DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA

Though the end of the cold war elicited broad human rights concerns to the extent that they

take centre stage not only in nation's foreign policies but also in world politics as a whole, the issue of terrorism has remained problematic to the international community as it has increasingly impacted negatively on nation's foreign policies

This peculiar act of criminality ranges from suicide bombing (Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during the World War II and World Trade Centre in the United States in 2001) to kidnapping of individuals which is presently gaining recognition in Nigeria.

Irrespective of factors that gave rise to terrorism, it is however a non-single state phenomenon, but as its activities heightens in one country or the other, it affects the entire globe because of the increasing interdependence across borders. The major challenge today is how to tackle the dastardly act.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism generally gained legitimacy and justification in the International community as many countries considered it to be their international obligation to fight the social menace. In other words, confronting the criminal act has become one of the most important fundamentals of national governments. To be sure, the US, the conceived major victim and target of the terrorism has come to dominate the scene in the fight to abolishing terrorist activities by prioritizing democratization processes.

From the US administration's perspective, future 11 September type of attacks can only be prevented through liberalization and democratization (though highly contested by third world scholars, who advocate for socio-economic development as the way out). This was a key rationale used by the Bush administration to mobilize public support for conducting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For instance, the eradication of Al-Qaeda type of terrorist activities in Afghanistan and the subsequent war in Iraq was premised on denying terrorists access to weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). However, the concept of liberal democracy has since inception been under attack this confirms what Solomon Lar, former national chairman of Nigeria's ruling peoples democratic party(PDP) from 1998, observed that *"democracy has been hard for poor countries to accept and practice, placing them on slippery ground"* (Lar,2003:3). And in support, Nnoli suggests that political liberation is difficult to sustain under conditions of mass economic privation and great inequalities of wealth within a society(Nnoli,2000:181). In addition escalating political instability and uncertainty in countries.

Terrorism has a large effect on economic activity: the capital stock (human and physical) of a country is often reduced as a result of terrorist attacks; it promotes increases in counter-terrorism expenditures, drawing resources from productive sectors for use in security; it has an adverse effect on specific industries such as tourism and it reduces the expected return to investment, that is, changes in the intensity of terrorism have an ambiguous effect on the overall investment position of the world (such as, investment over wealth).

Terrorism may also portend large movements of capital across countries of the world economy is sufficiently open. It is in such cases, corporate (International) Investors rate terrorism as one of the essential factors influencing foreign investment decisions. just like what mostly the Northern part of Nigeria is facing at the wake of the boko-haram attacks altering the budget for socio-economic development for security expenditure, crippling education and economic activities, with businesses relocating to the southern or eastern part of the country where their businesses are relatively secured from the earthquakes of Boko-Haram. For instance, about 60% of Nigerian businesses have relocated to Ghana which is

stable. The amount of foreign direct investment in the US prior and after the September 11 attacks provide some evidence of the open economy channel of terrorism. In the year 2000, before the terrorist attacks, foreign direct investment inflows represented about 15.8 percent of the Gross Fixed Capital formation in the US. This figure decreased to only 1.5 percent in 2003, two years after the attack.

The same is the case in Nigeria hitherto. Since the increase in proportion of kidnapping and Boko-Haram activities mostly in the Northern Nigeria, with spilled over effects on the North central States, the number of international investors coming to Nigeria has reduced drastically while some foreign companies who had been in Nigeria years before the terrorist activities began have relocated to other neighbouring countries such as Ghana and South Africa where they are sure to enjoy relative peace, security and supply of electricity.

CONCLUSION

the resurgence of religious uprisings in Northern Nigeria to be particular is interpreted within the context of government inability (or, perhaps, reluctance) to deal decisively with the sickness of poverty, which has robbed about 70% of Nigeria's population from a decent and more dignified way of life, and the culture of impunity- which means allowing the protagonists of all these dastardly acts go unpunished. This in its own way has entrenched the culture of impunity. Implicitly, it is a fact that once a culprit or a sect member is not brought under the wrath of the law, the probability of him returning to the same crime is high. Thereby, promoting a circle of violence. And where violence prevails, economic activities drop to the lowest ebb, social activities will be suspended, life becomes meaningless and properties destroyed. Indeed, what could not be conclusively proved is if the Kala Kato riot was a continuation of the Boko Haram riot, a resurgence of the Maitatsine movement of the 1980s, or perhaps another face of the hydra-headed monster that Islamic extremism is gradually assuming in Nigeria. The growing problem of Islamic fundamentalism appears to be more deep-rooted in the deficit of good governance among the Northern and Nigerian leaders at large. Than the approaches adopted by the Nigerian government to address the menace of the group, given the danger it poses to the country and global security, and given the more serious response by nations around the world to terrorism related events, comprehensive and drastic measures that are aimed at addressing this social ill has to be proffered. But first, the root cause must be unraveled. For "Wishing the problem away, pretending it is not there, or that it is not as serious as it is, is akin to sitting on a time bomb. The recurrent nature of intra and inter-ethnic religious crises with ethnic angles is a timely warning" Omipidan, (2009a).

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