Nigeria and Security Sector Reform

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Abstract

The last seven years have been significant in Nigeria's history not only for the democratization process that the country is undergoing but also for the programme of reforms that has been introduced by the Obasanjo administration. Of particular reference, is its reforms in the security sector, where efforts have been made to correct some of the ills that had in the past, bedeviled the various security agencies in the country. However, it is clear that inspite of all its efforts, it is yet to enunciate a security sector reform agenda or develop a government-wide policy for identifying and spreading good practices in the security sector. This paper proposes a comprehensive security sector reform agenda which, it is hoped, will assist the government in its ongoing efforts to promote security sector reform in the country. The objective is to foster discussion on the scope and content of security sector reform within government, the various security agencies and civil society.

Introduction

The return of democratic rule to Nigeria in 1999 ushered in a season of reforms in various sectors of national life. The experience so far can be described as one dominated by reforms, and the Obasanjo presidency has left no one in doubt that it is on a mission of national rebirth. President Obasanjo himself has called this the Nigeria Project: one in which the country must be made to leap-frog into the 21st century if it is to realize its manifest destiny as a major player on the international stage. This is a theme that runs through all the major speeches of the President delivered at different fora both within and outside Nigeria.

After seven years of these reforms, it is clear that they are wide-ranging and are expected to cover all areas. So far, the list of the areas where these reforms are being carried out is a long one, but there are still many others to be embarked upon even if the signs are there. These reforms have been witnessed in the communication sector; education sector; health sector; agricultural sector; oil and gas; pension; banking sector; labour; the civil service; and political and government sector. All these are undergirded

by the reforms which have enthroned private enterprise as the driver of the process that should deliver the Nigerian project. The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) provides the framework for the actions being undertaken by the Federal Government in all these areas. The point has to be made from the beginning that these reforms were undertaken with considerable external pressure from the leading creditor nations and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The one sector which is critical to the success of reforms in the other sectors, because it alone can provide the conducive environment for the others to thrive, is the security sector. Therefore, reforming the security sector is a necessary condition for the attainment and sustenance of the successes achieved in other sectors. However, it cannot be said that Nigeria has undertaken what is known as security sector reform (SSR). Security Sector Reform is a programme which is designed to enhance the democratic content in countries undergoing transformation.

Although Nigeria is going through a process of transformation, government action with regard to the security sector since 1999 cannot be described as SSR. This is the point from which this contribution is being made. The place to begin is to seek to understand the concepts of security, the security sector and its dynamic nature in national life. In addition, it addresses the actors and relationships in the security sector; the issues of reform, transformation, reconstruction and governance of the security sector; the Nigerian government's actions in the security sector; and the need to enhance the democratic governance of the security sector.

The Concept of Security: Traditional and Other Perspectives

Survival is said to be the first priority for man, and this has come to him as a law of nature. The capacity to ensure survival remains the most important preoccupation of all human beings since it is certainly not possible to engage in any activity unless the safety of life is assured. It is this conception which Thomas Hobbes used to justify the existence of an absolute form of government (the Leviathan) in his native England. He argued that a strong, unchallenged government was needed to ensure the safety of life which was otherwise endangered in a competitive environment without anyone to provide law and order. Therefore, the political community which resulted from the contract entered into by individuals had the sole purpose to guarantee the safety of life.

In the context of the activities which take place within the state and externally between states in a world that lacks a central government, security is seen as the primary responsibility to provide. The history of man organized into political

communities has been dominated by concern over how best to provide security, a first order value to any state. This concern over the security of the state has remained the defining characteristic of relations between states in their interactions. Therefore, to appreciate fully the complex activities generated by this phenomenon, it is necessary to first gain an understanding of the concept of security.

However, the search for an understanding of security as a concept is easily frustrated by the absence of an agreed general definition[1]. This is the case with most social phenomena which hardly lend themselves to common understanding because they are often approached from different perspectives. Although the concept of security has always been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destruction, the experts have come up with many definitions. This point was adequately demonstrated by Buzan when he lined up a number of scholars with their definitions of security[2]. For instance, Mroz has defined security as "The *relative freedom* from harmful threats." For Arnold Wolfers, "Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked." Or as Walter Lippmann sees it, "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war."

These conceptions which are within the realist school of international relations, generally hold that the state is the only institution which is vested with the responsibility (and power) to ensure the safety of its territory and its people. This granted the state monopoly over the use of force in order to carry out this responsibility which is seen in essentially military terms with regard to external threats, and looked at security to mean the capability to successfully repel external threats and maintain law and order within. It built up an elaborate bureaucracy to address this issue of security from internal to external threats. This understanding of security is what is now known as the traditional perspective. It looks at the issue from the capability of the military and security forces to guarantee this most important of values. This traditional conception of security is narrow to the extent that it emphasizes the preparedness of the defence and security forces, while subsuming the safety of citizens to that of the state.

However, experience came to show that the traditional conception is not adequate to address the security dilemma of states such as those in Africa. From the late 1970s, a broader and more holistic concept of security emerged and became dominant after the Cold War. The developments which have taken place over the past 25 years have made security more complex requiring a new understanding. Samai observes that security is a multi-dimensional concept, but that in relation to the state, its levels or dimensions must be specified as political and military, social and economic as well as

internal and external[3]. He further asserts that the three dimensions outlined above can be sub-divided into four interrelated circles, namely the security of individuals, the security of the social system, the security of country groupings (regional security) and the security of mankind as a whole (global security).

For African states the threats to their security today are beyond the narrow confines of the traditional perspectives to include:

- Political threats such as internal political instability, failed states, terrorism and human rights abuses.
- Economic threats such as poverty, the growing gap between rich and poor countries, international financial recession, the impact of an economically powerful or unstable neighbouring state, and piracy;
- Environmental or man-made threats such as nuclear disaster, global ecological changes, degradation of land or water, lack of food and other resources;
- Social threats such as minority/majority conflicts, overpopulation, organized crime, transnational drug-trafficking, illegal trade, uncontrolled wars, migration, and disease [4]

Therefore, the traditional conception of security and the new perspective are treated as two sides of the same coin because neither makes meaning on its own without the other. While one (the traditional) sees security as the security of the state, the other defines it as human security. In Africa, the latter is the most urgent need to be addressed by a security sector which reflects this complexity. This also needs to be clearly defined.

Defining the Security Sector

In the same way that the concept of security has remained a contested one, so also the concept of security sector. Hanggi has observed that there are almost as many definitions as there are scholars and institutional actors trying to define what the security sector is made up of.[5] He identifies two broad perspectives from which the concept can be defined. He sees the security sector from the security perspective as:

All those state institutions, which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion such as the armed forces (domestic and foreign). the police, gendarmerie and para-military forces, the intelligence and secret services, border and customs guards as well as judicial and penal institutions.[6]

And from the perspective of government, Hanggi argues that the security sector covers:

The elements of the public sector responsible for the exercise of the state monopoly of coercive power…(and includes) the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for management and control of the security forces, such as the executive government, the relevant ministries (so-called power ministries; particularly the ministries of defence and of the interior), the parliament and its specialized committees[7]

These perspectives do cover the spectrum of security sector institutions and organizations, but they do not provide a single definition that is useful for analysis. Thus, Hendrickson improves this further when he argues that the security sector encompasses three pillars.[8]

a. Groups with a mandate to wield the instruments of violence – military, paramilitaries and police forces
b. Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring the security –civil ministries, parliaments and NGOs.
c. Bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the judiciary, the penal system, human rights, ombudsman and where these bodies are particularly weak, the international community.

Fitz-Gerald provides an even wider list of actors and agencies which make up security sector[9]. The list includes the following;

a. Bodies authorized to use force (the armed forces, police, paramilitary units and intelligence services);
b. Civil management and oversight bodies (the President/Prime minister, the legislature and legislative committees, national security advisory bodies, statutory civil society organizations, the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs);
c. Judicial and public security bodes (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and prosecution services, prisons and correction services, human rights commissions and customary and traditional justice system.
d. Non-state security bodies (private security companies, political party militias, liberation armies, civil defence forces); and
e. Civil society bodies (the media, religious, professional, advocacy and non-governmental organizations).

The five categories of key actors enumerated above give a holistic picture of the security sector as it should be understood today. However, in the context it is being addressed here, the security sector consists of:

all those organizations that have authority to use, or order the use of force or threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight.[10]

To deliver safety to the state, its citizens and the civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight, the actors in the security sector must interact intensively and that makes the sector very dynamic. When this is viewed within the context of the historical experiences of African states, the interactions within the security sector have thrown up the need for reform, transformation, reconstruction and democratic governance. Therefore, it is necessary to address the dynamics of the security sector in order to understand why the reform, transformation or reconstruction of the sector as the case may be.

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The Dynamics of the Security Sector

The logic of the social contract which created the state not only gave to it the monopoly of the legitimate use of force but also that it would guarantee to the citizen security. This mean that the individual also gave up the right to arm and protect himself, leaving this instead to the state through its institutions to provide this public good. It is in this context that the realist position that equated the security of the state or national security with that of the individual, gained dominance. Thus, institutions which were allowed by law to use force to defend states against external threats as well as maintain law and order internally, were created. These institutions were expected to put at the service of the individual citizens through the service to the state.

In Africa, the experience did not fit the realist assumption of the security of the state being at the same time that of the individual. It turned out that the pattern established by colonial rule where the security forces protected the colonizer but not the colonized, was the order of the day. Protection was given to the elite who were in power and the institutions of the state which gave them such power alone, but not to the citizens. Instead, the apparatus of the state security was employed against the citizens during the period of misrule by one-party and military dictatorships in equal measure.

Therefore, for the individual in Africa, state security became one of the major threats to his security. This argument has been extended further to the effect that what is taken as state security or national security is really nothing but regime security. It means that the security forces are primarily looking after the interest of the regime in

power and not the people. The hallmarks of regime security have been given by Hutchfull[11]

- An orientation to internal rather than external security;
- Protection of an incumbent government and officials rather than citizens or state institutions;
- Criminalisation of political opposition;
- Reliance on special security units (rather than public security) and foreign-powers and mercenaries;
- Orientation of the Police and intelligence to 'political policing';
- Lack of transparency (and respect for human rights in security policy and operations);
- Monopoly control of security by the executive wing;
- Orientation of the police and intelligence to 'political policing'; and
- Heavy involvement of the military in domestic security.

The insecurity for the individual which resulted from regime security phenomenon that prevailed in Africa during the Cold War period led to increased emphasis on the need to have human security instead. This became more glaring after the cold war as many states witnessed the collapse or near collapse of the state and its institutions. In several countries, internal violent conflicts erupted after the cold war and triggered off large population movement with all the attendant consequences in terms of insecurity, death, poverty, among others. The concepts of humanitarian intervention, human security gained currency, and the definition of a much wider concept than the traditional one which laid emphasis on national security and not on the security of the nationals.

In this sense, anything which threatened the security of the individual, whether its origin was social, economic, environmental, political, health, among other factors, fall within human security. As efforts are made to address these problems, the framework which have been developed for this involves reform, transformation and reconstruction of the security sector within democratic governance. The pressure for this has come from within as well as from outside the countries involved. Therefore, what is generally known as Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become an imperative for countries in West Africa and this deserves a sustained scrutiny by scholars practitioners and all citizens.

What is Security Sector Reform?

The prevailing condition of insecurity where physical safety is not guaranteed and human security indicators are in the negative, recommends itself to serious change. As we have indicated, for many countries in Africa, security is a very scarce and unaffordable commodity beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. For the most part, the state has lacked the capacity to provide the required level of security even in states that are not failing. The result is that life literally becomes a matter of survival of the fittest where people work out their own arrangements through self-help and the like. This has given rise to anarchical situations where everyone with a gun can easily lay down the 'law' for their helpless victims to follow. There has been a virtual 'state of nature' especially in areas going through violent conflicts in West Africa.

Therefore, a critical aspect of the strategy to rescue the people of Africa from the jungle condition they have been thrown into in the post-cold war period, is to cause a change in the management of the security sector. This is what is commonly referred to as security sector reform, and has been defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) thus:

Security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the security system – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.[12]

In the African situation, SSR may be more appropriately understood to mean transformation or reconstruction of the security sector, owing to the appalling condition it is in. The goal is to get the security institutions to eventually play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for citizens. This requires such measures as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector, professionalisation of the security forces, and strengthening the rule of law, among others. Therefore, four broad areas of SSR initiatives have been the focus of action:

a.   **The Political Dimension:** Here, the transitions from authoritarian to democratic system of government taking place in most of Africa must also impact on the security forces, themselves being part of the infrastructure for authoritarian rule. Democratic control and civilian oversight of the security forces. The core task of SSR in this area is to have good governance where the security forces operate within their constitutionally defined roles and due process and

accountability prevail. It also includes the capacity of civil society such as the media, non-governmental organizations, research institutes and the public at large, to facilitate debate on security priorities. Civilian oversight of the security forces will remain a key feature of the political dimension of SSR.

b.   **The Economic Dimension:** The key issue here is the allocation of resources to this sector. The rational allocation of human, financial and material resources to the security sector is critical to its functioning efficiently and effectively. This is a very important factor to bear in mind in the light of the understanding of security to include both state and human security. Reform must aim to develop the skills and practices to identify needs and key objectives of the sector, determine what is affordable, prioritize resource allocation, and ensure the efficient and effective use of these resources.

c.   **The Social Dimension:** This is the area where the focus is on security as holistic concept which involves state security and human security as two sides of the same coin. The prime task of the security sector and its actors is to guarantee the internal and external security of the population. It involves the security of the population from attacks of all kinds on their life, health and property. This will enable the sustenance of an environment conducive to the actualization of the human potential.

d.   **The Institutional Dimension:** The focus of reform here is the structure of the security sector and the institutional separation of the various forces and organizations. The different forces can only be efficient and accountable if the various institutional tasks are clearly defined. An institutional overlap between domestic public security and external defence increases the danger of intervention by the military in domestic affairs. The current situation is one where such overlap is prevalent in many countries.

Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Nigeria

On assumption of power in 1999, the new democratic government in Nigeria inherited a security sector which was a danger to society, instead of providing security to the people. There was already such a high level of insecurity arising from violent crimes and lawlessness by individuals and groups who were either armed robbers or militias engaged in killing people to attain their own goals. As the state became less able to guarantee security to its citizens, the tendency to provide this essential public

good on a self-help basis became an attractive option to many individuals and groups. Thus, conflicts between groups and communities often witnessed the use of firearms. This trend intensified after the return to democratic rule with a rising spate of communal, ethno-religious and other forms of violent conflicts. The reasons for which violence could break

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out between communities increasingly became stranger than fiction.

The situation above was compounded by a security sector which was used to the culture of impunity in its primary work of ensuring regime security. In that role, the security forces were used against the people to suppress opposition, oppress the people and protect the regime in power. Thus, some of the violence and killings witnessed during the military era were said to be the handwork of the security forces. The low pay which obtained in the public sector also affected the security forces, and this encouraged some of them to prey on the larger population by using their arms. The cases of security personnel being involved in armed robbery, and the policemen shooting and killing commercial drivers who refused to give N20 at the checkpoints became very common.

In an environment such as this, one would expect that people who committed these violent crimes would be appropriately dealt with according to the law of the land. Here too, the situation was not any better as the judiciary itself and the criminal justice system as a whole was corrupt, inefficient and ineffective. Often, justice was delayed and denied. The prisons were busting with inmates who were awaiting trial. These were often in the majority and some of them were known to have been in prison without trial for longer than they would have been if they had been tried and convicted for the offences that put them there in the first place. The result was gross violation of human rights, and the rule of law was alien to such an environment.

It was this environment which the new democratic government had to change in line with the tenets of democracy. And the expectations were understandably high as far as the people were concerned. They had suffered the excesses perpetrated in a security environment dominated by impunity, and now wanted the dividends of democracy by way of rule of law, the observance of human rights and the democratic governance of the security sector. The government promised action in line with these wishes and some actions were taken in certain areas of the security sector. However, there was no comprehensive, coherent and well-articulated SSR programme put in place to drive this process. Rather, action was taken on selective basis, beginning with the military.

What to do with the military after transition to democratic rule in 1999 became a matter of top priority to the government. This was understandable because military adventurism had led to military rule over Nigeria for over 30 years, a period during which democracy was banished from the land. Therefore, if the new democratic experiment was to survive, the military had to undergo certain change as a matter of urgency. The immediate concern was how to stop the military from threatening the new political order as they had done in the past. Some of the measures taken included the weeding-out of those who were described as political officers, that is those officers who had held political offices in previous military regimes. It was feared that they would threaten democracy if they remained in service.

Those who were left behind in service were now to be put through a process of re-orientation to the traditional role of the professional military. This professional military was understood to be an instrument of the state for its defence and protection, but under the direction and control of a democratically elected civilian political authority. The military was therefore to be the defender of the democratic political system without itself being a partisan political actor. Government actions in this area came to be known variously as re-professionalisation, restructuring, re-organisation and even 'down-sizing' of the military. These initially came through the Military Professionals Resource International (MPRI), a private corporation made up of mainly retired senior US military officers. The MPRI was engaged by the Nigerian Government to help in reforming the military in the area of Resources Management, Civil-military coordination, Doctrine and Training Systems. The key

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elements of the civil-military coordination were the re-organisation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), improved relations between the MoD and the National Assembly, civil-military laws that support civil authority and training programmes, and other civic education that enhance civil military relations. The MPRI did not complete these tasks for reasons which are not the concern of this paper. The point has to be made that the critical Nigerian stakeholders saw it as foreign imposition on them. However, a Defence Policy was produced by the executive branch of government within the period.

Meanwhile, the Nigeria Police Force, perhaps the security outfit that was in the worst state in comparison with the others, also needed to be attended to urgently. The force was also a victim of years of abuse by the military authorities and its leadership. It was therefore overwhelmed by the upsurge in violence which followed the return to

civil rule because it lacked the necessary equipment and morale to face the new agents of violence who were better equipped and funded. Again, the selective intervention by government went in favour of increasing the number of personnel in the Nigeria Police Force. Therefore, in 2000 the Federal Government decided that 40,000 people would be recruited into the force over a period of 5 years. This was not complimented by addressing issues such as the attitude of the police, welfare and facilities; therefore things remained pretty much at the same level. Since then, the Nigeria Police Force has had to contend with the threat of strike by its personnel over pay and the difficult conditions of service. As has been the case with the military, the Federal Government is yet to address the problems of the police through a well-articulated transformation programme.

The situation with the police is replicated in the correctional system and the criminal justice system as a whole. The prison officers are working in deplorable conditions like the police and their prisons are overcrowded with the category of inmates known as the awaiting trial men (ATM). The judiciary which is expected to try these cases and deliver justice is itself no different from the police and the prison service. The decay that has been identified in the Nigerian public service also abounds in this area of the security sector. Like the police, the prisons and the judiciary are in urgent need of transformation before security can be delivered to the people as provided for in the constitution. Again this requires a deliberate programme of transformation to guide the process, and it is not available. The prison like the police are awaiting the reports of the committees on their reforms which were set up by the Federal Government.

Enhancing the Reform and Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

The security situation and the security sector remain a far cry from what should obtain in a democracy. Insecurity is still a major concern in Nigeria as violence is a common weapon used by groups to address their grievances, and this is happening in all parts of Nigeria. In some parts, such as the Niger Delta region, the situation has become a source of concern to countries which have companies and nationals who are working in the oil and gas sector of the Nigerian economy. The result of this is that people are being killed, production activities are being disrupted, kidnappings of expatriate oil workers go on despite the security operation taking place to stop it. Also, Nigeria's external image as a country where people could come and invest their funds without any security fears, has been severely damaged. Other interests which are important to Nigeria's success as a leading nation in the world could suffer unless she enhances the transformation and democratic governance of the security sector. This should be done in line with the areas of SSR initiatives that have been the focus of action in other countries faced with similar problems in the security sector.

At the political level, SSR in Nigeria should be about effectively transiting to democratic governance from the authoritarian past where impunity was a way of life. Since the security forces themselves were a part of the infrastructure for authoritarian rule, this makes democratic control and civilian oversight of these forces absolutely necessary. Within this framework, the elected leaders who are constitutionally empowered to direct and control the security sector must be seen to exercise such powers. This means, for example, that the National Assembly must be enabled to exercise its powers of oversight over all security forces. At the moment, it is not clearly demonstrated that the National Assembly can play this role in the same way their counterparts do elsewhere, on all security forces. The core of this issue is to have good governance and research institutes in Nigeria participate in discussing and making proposals to improve the democratic governance of the security sector. This is not the case in Nigeria today, although there are many civil society groups and non-governmental organizations which have a lot to offer in this area, and are willing to do so. The experience so far is that the security sector remains a restricted area. It can not remain so in a democracy because the security sector must be accountable at all times. That is why civilian oversight of the security forces remains a key feature of any SSR, at the political level.

There is also an economic dimension to this issue which goes beyond the allocation of resources. SSR will require the rationing of human, financial and material resources to the security sector to make it efficient and effective. This means that economic reforms such as the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) must not sacrifice the requirements of the security sector to provide adequate service to the nation. The way to strike this balance is to understand security to include both state and human security. This understanding will enable policies with regard to the economy, social development, political and security policy to be coordinated to strengthen each other at the level of grand strategy. Essentially, security and development should be seen as two sides of the same coin where each contributes to the advancement of the other.

At the institutional level, SSR in Nigeria should ensure clear separation of tasks which the various security organizations are expected to carry out. There should be no room for institutional overlap between the functions of these forces. For example, the management of internal conflicts in Nigeria has often seen the military and the Nigeria Police Force performing similar tasks. This has not made for efficiency and effectiveness in this area, as these operations were often accompanied by public outcries of disapproval. The security forces often find themselves operating in difficult circumstances as it is, and lack of this clear definition of tasks makes the assessment

of their performance also difficult. Therefore, SSR should address this area to save Nigeria from further ugly experiences such as conflicts between security agencies.

A corollary to the above is the urgent need for Nigeria to address the lack of coordination of the security institutions. The experience had been one in which institutions dealing with security operate at cross-purposes to the extent that problems are compounded instead of being solved. Parochialism in bureaucratic systems tends to make agencies engage in acts which can only be interpreted to be protecting "their territories", rather than working together with others in the sector to achieve the common goal. Therefore, reform in the security sector must aim to effect change in attitudes and values which stand in the way of cooperation and coordination among institutions in the security sector.

Furthermore, Nigeria should put in place a national security policy framework which incorporates the political, economic, social and military dimensions to allow for the desired synergy of efforts between the agencies involved in the security sector. This framework should be popularly articulated through an inclusive participatory process which should see the society not only buying into it but also "owning" it, in line with the requirements for the democratic governance of the sector. This should make security the business of all citizens because they have a stake in it. This "ownership" by society should be the ultimate goal of SSR in Nigeria.

Conclusion

The issue of SSR, (which in the case of Africa a more appropriate terminology to use is transformation or even reconstruction because of the dire state of this sector), is unavoidable and must be faced. It is also getting increasingly complex both in terms of the issues involved and the number of interests and actors as well. No African country can remain unaffected by the pressure for change in the security sector. This pressure is both internal from a population traumatized by the excesses of the security forces under authoritarian rule; and external from donor countries and agencies whose support is contingent on an African country undertaking reforms which include SSR.

Another important conclusion to draw on this subject is that insecurity has become a one-world problem requiring concerted efforts on the part of all stakeholders to address. These efforts must include the imperative of educating and sensitizing people on the necessity of working for security sector transformation in countries that place high on the scale of insecurity[13]. The full range of issues must be brought out, studied, . analyzed and disseminated to spur people into action. It is here that the role of experts

in the security sector is very critical because they must serve as the vendor of the ideas and knowledge about SSR, not only to the various actors already identified, but also to the public at large.

End Notes

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